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Summary
This thesis consists of three independent chapters (or papers): the first on
the dynamics of an extended version of the Lucas (1988) endogenous growth
model, the second on the effects of intergenerational mobility and social security
on savings and inequality in a dynastic model with life-cycle features, and the
last is an empirical study of the causal effects of economic growth on health
expenditures using oil price shocks as the instrument. The first two chapters are
co-authored with my supervisor, Professor Jie Zhang.
Diverse development experiences across nations and over time challenge stan-
dard growth theories. In the first chapter, we investigate the dynamics of bal-
anced growth paths (BGPs) in an extended Lucas model incorporating physical
capital inputs, human capital externalities, and decreasing returns to scale in ed-
ucation. Combining such extensions with increasing social returns in production
maintains the existence of BGPs, creates indeterminacies for plausible human
capital externalities, and induces possibly two BGPs for sufficiently elastic in-
tertemporal substitution. The high-growth BGP accompanies more resources
devoted to education than the low-growth BGP. Income taxes can either pro-
mote or depress long-run growth and have divergent effects on multiple BGPs.
In the last two decades of the 20th century, two noteworthy macroeconomic
trends in the United States were the sharp decline of personal savings and the rise
of income and wealth inequality. Over the same period, the social security pro-
gram expanded by more than one fifth and intergenerational mobility declined.
In the second chapter, we examine the effects of falling intergenerational mobility
and rising social security on savings and distributions of wealth and income in a
dynastic model with two-sided altruism and uncertain earnings ability. We find
that household responses to changes in intergenerational mobility and social secu-
rity are both heterogeneous: When mobility falls, high-earning households reduce
savings while low-earning households raise savings; when social security expands,
households experiencing upward (downward) mobility between generations tend
to reduce (raise) savings. Both life-cycle and two-sided altruism features of the
model improve the fitting of the simulated wealth distribution to the data. The
counter-factual simulations find that falling mobility and expanding social secu-
vi
rity can explain more than half of both the fall in gross domestic savings and the
rises of wealth and income inequality from 1980 to 2000 in the United States.
The last chapter is motivated by the rapid rise of health spending in both
developed and emerging economies, and attempts to examine the causal effects
of economic growth on national health expenditures, using time series variations
in international oil prices interacted with proved oil reserves as an instrument
for GDP growth. Contrary to what might have been expected, the benchmark
estimate for the effects of the GDP per capita growth on the health expenditures
per capita growth is -0.96 with a standard error 0.09, and its 95% confidence in-
terval is [-1.13, -0.78]. Private and out-of-pocket expenditures on health are more
negatively responsive to economic growth than public expenditures. The positive
(negative) effects of economic growth on adult mortality rates (life expectancy)
suggest that the higher opportunity cost of receiving medical services when the
economic is growing fast is probably the dominating force. Using growth rates
over longer horizons, the long-run estimates remain negative and significant. Var-
ious robustness checks are conducted and the negative effects of economic growth
on health expenditures remain robust.
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Diverse development experiences across nations and over time for the same na-
tion challenge standard theories of economic growth with convergence towards a
unique balanced growth path. Two decades ago, Lucas (1993) used the Philip-
pines and South Korea as examples for very different growth paths starting from
similar conditions in 1960. Since 1980, some emerging economies such as China
and India have switched to a rapid growth path.
Dynamics at steady states or balanced growth paths (BGPs) have long been
studied in various versions or extensions of the Uzawa (1965) model with constant
returns to scale in production for goods and in education for human capital
accumulation. Even with physical capital in education, this approach typically
leads to the existence, uniqueness, and saddle-path stability (determinacy) of the
BGP, as in Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1993), Stokey and Rebelo (1995), and
Bond et al. (1996). Incorporating positive sector-specific externalities of both
physical and human capital in two sectors, Mino (2001) shows that indeterminacy
could emerge at a unique steady state even in cases with decreasing private
returns to scale and constant social returns to scale. Ladron-de-Guevara et al.
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(1997, 1999) find multiple steady states with endogenous leisure. Introducing
leisure externalities, however, Azariadis et al. (2013) find a unique BGP.
To enrich the mechanics of development, Lucas (1988) incorporates empiri-
cally plausible spillovers of average human capital (e.g. Young, 1928; Basu and
Fernald, 1997; Harris and Lau, 1998; Moretti, 2004a, 2004b) that generate in-
creasing social returns in production in the Uzawa model. Benhabib and Perli
(1994) find indeterminacy in the Lucas model for a greater role of externalities
than physical capital (γ > β) and sufficiently elastic intertemporal substitution.
They also find multiple BGPs when incorporating a leisure-labor trade-off. Ty-
ing the intertemporal elasticity of substitution with the role of physical capital,
Xie (1994) finds a global continuum of equilibrium paths converging to a unique
BGP under the same condition γ > β. While indeterminacy (a continuum of
transitional equilibrium paths) helps to explain diverse growth experiences in fi-
nite time, multiple BGPs help to explain them in the long run. Throughout this
paper, “indeterminacy” is used to describe the fact that there are multiple tran-
sitional equilibrium paths that all converge to the same BGP, and “multiplicity”
is used to describe the fact that the BGP is not unique.
Yet, it is unclear whether human capital spillovers are more important than
physical capital in production for indeterminacy. Also, using effective labor as
the sole input in education with constant returns to scale in typical Lucas mod-
els may be overly simplified. According to Bowen (1987) and Jones and Zim-
mer (2001), physical investment is important in education. Borjas (1992, 1995),
among others, finds empirical evidence for human capital externalities in edu-
cation. Moreover, Psacharopoulos (1994) and Trostel (2004) present empirical
evidence for significantly decreasing private and/or social returns to scale, at
least at higher levels of education. Compared to production, formal education
is a new, costly social institution. Usually known as a force for convergence
and stagnation, decreasing returns to scale in education cast doubt about the
existence, multiplicity and indeterminacy of sustainable balanced growth paths.
We investigate the existence, multiplicity, and indeterminacy of BGPs in an
extended Lucas model by incorporating several factors in the education sector:
physical capital inputs, human capital externalities, and decreasing returns to
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scale. In doing so, we do not start with any strong restrictions on factor intensi-
ties or externalities for our model. As in Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1993), we
begin with relatively general forms of technologies and identify the restrictions on
the parameters for the existence of balanced growth, viewing the Uzawa (1965)
and the Lucas (1988) models as special cases. The present model makes sev-
eral contributions. Combining such extensions with increasing social returns in
production maintains the existence of balanced growth, creates indeterminacies
for plausible human capital externalities, and induces multiple balanced growth
paths for sufficiently elastic intertemporal substitution. The high-growth BGP
accompanies more resources devoted to education than the low-growth BGP. In-
come taxes can either promote or depress long-run growth and have divergent
effects on multiple BGPs.
The intuition for indeterminacy here comes in part from human capital ex-
ternalities for increasing returns to scale in production as in existing work, and in
part from the more general education technology. Starting from any equilibrium
path, one may construct another by saving more and allocating more resources
to education, so long as the return on capital increases sufficiently and as con-
sumers have strong enough willingness for intertemporal substitution. Stronger
increasing returns in production via human capital spillovers allow the return on
physical capital to increase more. A higher educational output elasticity of hu-
man capital in the present model enhances the effectiveness of this intersectoral
reallocation. When physical investment plays a role in education, the comple-
mentarity between physical and human capital promotes the effectiveness of this
intersectoral reallocation further, by allocating more physical capital to educa-
tion together with human capital. So indeterminacy can occur for weaker human
capital externalities than those in the literature.
The source for multiple BGPs here hinges on the balance between decreas-
ing private/social returns to scale in education and increasing social returns in
production via human capital externalities, given strong enough intertemporal
substitution. The combination of decreasing returns to scale in education and
increasing returns to scale in production through human capital spillovers induce
low investment in education and a low growth rate compared to the efficient path
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internalizing externalities. Individuals with stronger willingness for intertemporal
substitution are more prone to investing more in education for higher equilibrium
returns from higher average human capital spillovers, which promotes growth.
Consequently, the low (high) growth BGP accompanies smaller (greater) shares
of human and physical capital used for education. It justifies popular promo-
tions for recognizing higher social returns on education. Absent these additional
factors in education, the BGP would be unique as in the original Lucas model.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 introduces the
model. Section 1.3 analyzes equilibrium paths, the existence and multiplicity
of BGPs, and the effects of income taxes on BGPs. Section 1.4 discusses local
determinacy/indeterminacy of BGPs. The last section concludes the paper. An
appendix contains all proofs.
1.2 The model
The model extends that in Lucas (1988) to incorporate a physical capital in-
put, human capital externalities, and decreasing returns to scale in education.
Starting with initial stocks of human and physical capital H(0) and K(0), the
representative agent maximizes utility derived from consumption C(t) over an
infinite horizon by choosing consumption, the fractions of human and physical








subject to the technologies for production and education, and the budget con-
straint (with all the time argument omitted for convenience):
Y = A(νK)β(uH)1−βHγa , (1.2)
H˙ = B[(1− ν)K]α[(1− u)H]ηHb(γ)a ≡ X, (1.3)
Y = C + K˙, (1.4)
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taking average human capital in the economy Ha as given. Here, 1/σ > 0 is
the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, ρ > 0 is the rate of time preference,
β ∈ [0, 1] and α ∈ [0, 1] are the output elasticities of physical capital in production
and in education respectively, η ∈ [0, 1] is the output elasticity of human capital
in education, and γ ≥ 0 and b(γ) are the degrees of human capital externalities
in production and education respectively. The exact form of b(γ) will be pinned
down later, when we discuss the existence of balanced growth. The literature has
already studied the following special cases of the model, a detailed review can be
found in Mattana et al. (2012):
1. Suppose γ = α = b(γ) = σ = 0. Uzawa (1965) shows that if an optimal
BGP exists, it is unique and the BGP is determinate. He treats more
general production functions without external effects.
2. Suppose γ = α = b(γ) = 0 and σ > 0. Caballe and Santos (1993) show
that if an optimal BGP exists, it is unique and the BGP is determinate.
They treat more general production functions without external effects.
3. Suppose α = b(γ) = 0, η = 1, σ > 0 and γ > 0. This is the Lucas (1988)
model. Benhabib and Perli (1994) show that if an optimal BGP exists, it
is unique and the BGP is indeterminate when σ is small and γ is large. Xie
(1994) analyzes the global indeterminacy when σ = β.
We restrict parameter configurations in plausible ranges. First, decreasing re-
turns to scale in education are allowed according to the aforementioned empirical
evidence:
Assumption 1: α+ η ≤ 1.
Next, education is more human capital intensive than production:
Assumption 2: η/α > (1− β)/β.
We can derive from those two assumptions that the output elasticity of phys-
ical capital is larger in production than in education, β > α, and this condition
will be used in some proofs.
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1.3 The equilibrium and balanced growth paths









where µ and λ are the Lagrangian multipliers. The first-order conditions are:
C : C−σ − µ = 0, (1.5)
K : µβY/K + λαX/K = ρµ− µ˙, (1.6)
H : µ(1− β)Y/H + ληX/H = ρλ− λ˙, (1.7)
ν : µβY/ν − λαX/(1− ν) = 0, (1.8)
u : µ(1− β)Y/u− ληX/(1− u) = 0, (1.9)
and (1.2)–(1.4). The transversality conditions are:
lim
t→∞µe
−ρtK = 0 and lim
t→∞λe
−ρtH = 0.
The first-order conditions can be simplified into an autonomous system of
differential equations concerning the control and state variables. First, equations



















(1− β)Y . (1.11)

























































= B[(1− ν)K]α[(1− u)H]ηHb(γ)−1. (1.16)
The derivation of the growth rate of u, the fraction of human capital used in

















1− ν . (1.17)














From Assumption 2, 0 ≤ D < 1, which will be used frequently later. The
positive relationship between ν and u in (1.19) stems from the complementarity
between physical and human capital in production and in education. Note that
ν = 1 if α = 0, which says physical capital is fully used in the production sector








































where the first factor on the right-hand side is positive (to be used later) since
Q ≡ β − α
D + (1−D)u + 1− η − β
=
(β − α)(1−D)(1− u) + (1− η − α)[D + (1−D)u]
D + (1−D)u > 0.
The equilibrium paths of (C,H,K, u, ν) are determined by (1.14), (1.15), (1.16),
(1.19) and (1.21).
1.3.1 The existence of balanced growth paths
A balanced or steady state growth path (BGP) refers to the stage of an equilib-
rium path on which the growth rates of Y , C, H, K and the fractions of human
and physical capital used in production (u and ν) become constant over time.
From (1.15), output, physical capital and consumption all grow at the same con-
stant rate on the BGP, denoted by g∗, however, human capital grows at the rate
(1−β)g∗/(1−β+ γ), as in the Lucas model. From this and (1.16), we pin down
the specific form of b(γ) linking the role of externalities in education to the role
of externalities in production for the existence of BGPs:
b(γ) = 1− η − α1− β + γ
1− β . (1.22)
This yields non-increasing social returns to scale in education, as α+η+b(γ) =
1−αγ/(1− β) ≤ 1. Intuitively, should both sectors have increasing social returns
to scale, the agent’s optimization problem in (1.1)–(1.4) would display explosive
growth over discounting and undermine the existence of BGPs. Should the social
returns to scale to education be too low, it would be impossible to sustain growth.
In the past two centuries, more and more countries have built up education
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institutions to sustain growth.
The present model allows for a wide range of parametrization. From (1.22),
the sign of human capital externalities in education may be positive or negative,
depending on the private return to scale in education. For example, b(γ) > 0 if
the private return to scale is so decreasing that 1− η−α(1−β+ γ)/(1−β) > 0.
If both sectors demonstrate constant private returns to scale (η = 1 − α), then
b(γ) = −αγ/(1−β) ≤ 0 as in Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1993) with sustainable
growth. In fact, private and social returns to scale in education could be both
decreasing as found empirically in the literature.
1.3.2 The multiplicity of balanced growth paths
For analytic convenience, we now reduce the system of differential equations
(1.14), (1.15), (1.16), (1.19) and (1.21) by one dimension using the balanced
growth relation z ≡ Z/H1+ γ1−β for the human-capital-adjusted value of the vari-
able Z, where Z = Y , K, or C:
k˙ = Aνβu1−βkβ − c− 1− β + γ









− 1− β + γ




















where ν and u have a one-for-one positive relationship in (1.19). On the BGP
where k˙ = c˙ = u˙ = 0, we can use (1.19) and (1.23)–(1.25) to solve for c∗, k∗, u∗
and ν∗:
From (1.16) and (1.22), the balanced growth rate g∗ can be expressed in terms









1− β + γ
1− β B(1− ν
∗)α(1− u∗)ηk∗α.















From (1.19) and (1.23)–(1.26), the steady-state values of other variables depend
on g∗:
u∗ = 1− η(1− β)g
∗
−γg∗ + (1− β + γ)(σg∗ + ρ) , (1.27)
ν∗ = 1− (1− β)ηDg
∗


















(σg∗ + ρ)− k∗g∗. (1.30)
Moreover, the transversality conditions require that µ˙/µ + K˙/K < ρ and
λ˙/λ + H˙/H < ρ on the BGP, and from equations (1.12) - (1.13) and (1.15) -
(1.16), they imply that g∗ has to satisfy:
σg∗ + ρ > g∗. (1.31)
It can be verified that this ensures interior solutions, i.e. C, K, H > 0 and
0 < ν, u < 1. It is now ready to explore the conditions for a unique BGP or
multiple BGPs.
Proposition 1. There is a unique BGP if σ > γ/(1− β + γ) or if η = 1.
Otherwise, there are possibly two BGPs for σ ≤ γ/(1− β + γ) and η < 1.
The BGP is unique in the Uzawa model with constant private and social
returns to scale in education, and in the Lucas model when human capital is
the sole education input with constant returns to scale. The present model
makes a contribution to produce multiple BGPs, as constructed in Figures 1.1-
1.3, through decreasing returns to scale in education, rather than through leisure
in the literature such as Benhabib and Perli (1994) and Ladron-de-Guevara et
al. (1997, 1999).
The higher balanced growth rate is associated with higher fractions of human
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and physical capital for education (low u∗ and low v∗) from (1.27) and (1.28).
Also, dividing both sides of (1.30) by y∗ yields the consumption to output ratio,
C/Y = c∗/y∗, which is higher for the low BGP. From (1.29), the higher BGP
is also associated with a lower adjusted physical capital to human capital ratio
k∗, in line with the typical view that relative abundance in human capital is
conducive to growth.
The reason for multiple BGPs hinges on the combination of decreasing pri-
vate or social returns in education and increasing social returns in production
via human capital spillovers, given strong enough intertemporal elasticities of
substitution. This combination results in low education investment compared to
the efficient level that internalizes human capital spillovers. As higher average
human capital generates positive spillovers on equilibrium factor returns, indi-
viduals with stronger willingness for intertemporal substitution are more prone
to investing more in human capital and physical capital. Multiple BGPs help to
explain persistent and large differentials in growth rates across countries.
There is no consensus in the literature on the value of the intertemporal elas-
ticity of substitution, a critical parameter for uniqueness versus multiplicity of
BGPs (and determinacy versus indeterminacy later). While low intertemporal
elasticities of substitution (σ ≥ 1) are typically used in the business cycle liter-
ature, there are empirical findings supporting elastic intertemporal substitution
in the range of σ = 0.5 to σ = 1. Such estimates are based on models with hu-
man capital and education components in Keane and Wolpin (2001) and Imai and
Keane (2004), with saving and financial market behaviors in Mulligan (2002) and
Vissing-Jorgensen and Orazio (2003), and with variations in the capital income
tax rates in Gruber (2006). Some of these estimates are in an intergenerational
framework that the Lucas model can be interpreted as.
1.3.3 Income taxes and balanced growth paths
As an application and to showcase that the properties of the two BGPs can
be quite different, we now examine the effects on balanced growth of uniform
income taxes at rate τ financing an exogenous public expenditure Gt under a










subject to education technology (1.3) and a budget constraint K˙ = (1−τ)rνK+
(1 − τ)wuH − C. The competitive interest and wage rates are: r = βY/(νK)
and w = (1 − β)Y/(uH). As shown in Appendix A.2, the system of equations
governing the equilibrium in this problem is the same as the original agent’s
problem in (1.1)–(1.4), except for a constant term (1 − τ) before A (the TFP),
therefore we can borrow all results from the benchmark model by adjusting its
TFP from A to an “effective” TFP (1 − τ)A. Therefore, income taxes have the
same effect on the economy as reducing the TFP from A to (1 − τ)A in the
original economy without taxes.
Note that the RHS of (1.26) is increasing in A only if α > 0. Thus, such
income taxes have no effects in the original Lucas model on the BGP as in
Novales et. al. (2014). However, we will show that such taxes can have diverse
effects on the BGPs when physical capital plays a role in the education sector
(α > 0).
In the first case, on a BGP for which the slope of the RHS of (1.26) is less than
that of the LHS at g∗, higher income taxes have a negative effect on the balanced
growth rate. More physical and human capital are devoted to production (Figure
1.4), due to the desire to increase after-tax income to compensate for the income
loss from higher taxes.
In the second case, on a BGP for which the slope of the RHS of (1.26) is
larger than that of the LHS at g∗, higher income taxes have a positive effect on
the balanced growth rate. More resources are now devoted to education (Figure
1.5), as higher income taxes have negative substitution effects on after-tax factor
returns in production. The substitution effects of higher income taxes lead to
faster income growth through education.
If there are two BGPs, then the low-growth BGP belongs to the first case
and the high-growth BGP belongs to the second case, because the LHS of (1.26)
is concave and the RHS is convex with respect to g∗, as shown in the proof of
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Proposition 1. In this mixed case, income taxes have divergent effects on the
two possible BGPs: the economy grows even slower if it was at a low-growth
BGP and grows even faster if it was at a high-growth BGP (Figure 1.6). A more
human-capital-abundant economy invests even more in human capital for faster
growth, whereas a less human-capital-abundant economy is trapped even deeper
in this low-growth regime by investing less in human capital.
1.4 Local stabilities of balanced growth paths
To study the local stability property of a BGP, we first calculate the 3-by-3
Jacobian matrix J of the dynamic system in (1.23)-(1.25) on the BGP with
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(1−D) [1− β + (β − α)ν∗]− 1 + αβ




where D ∈ [0, 1) is given below (1.19) and Q > 0 is given below (1.21).
Using the conventional approach, we identify the signs of the eigenvalues of
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the Jacobian matrix by calculating several characteristics: the determinant, the
trace, and a function B(J) which will be defined later. The determinant of the
Jacobian matrix is
det(J) = J13J21J32 − J23J31 + J21J33 − J11J23J32. (1.32)
We define θ ≡ (ρ, σ, A, B, γ, β, η, α, g∗) ∈ Θ ⊂ R5++×(0, 1)2×[0, 1)×R++
that satisfies Assumptions 1–2 and (1.26). We include g∗ here, since it is not in
general uniquely determined by the parameters and since multiple BGPs under






















We partition Θ into three subsets: Θ1≡{θ ∈ Θ |Z < 0}, Θ2≡{θ ∈ Θ |Z > 0}
and Θ3≡{θ ∈ Θ |Z = 0}. The determinant of J can be signed in these subsets
as follows:
Lemma 1. The sign of the determinant of the Jacobian matrix is given by
(i) det(J) < 0 if θ ∈ Θ1,
(ii) det(J) > 0 if θ ∈ Θ2,
(iii) det(J) = 0 if θ ∈ Θ3.
We will focus on the region Θ1
⋃
Θ2 only. As J22 = 0, the trace of the
Jacobian is
tr(J) = J11 + J33. (1.33)














= J21 − J23J32 + J11J33 − J13J31. (1.34)
We now present the stability of the BGP, while the condition in (1.31) from the
transversality conditions has to always hold.
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Proposition 2. A BGP is determinate if and only if θ ∈ Θ1, or if either (i) or
(ii) holds:
(i) σ ≥ 1
(ii) η ≤ 1− β + ασ
(1− σ)(1− β + γ) − α and 0 < σ < 1.
A BGP is always determinate if the intertemporal substitution is inelastic
enough (σ ≥ 1), which is consistent with the literature. It implies that indeter-
minacy cannot emerge when σ is relatively large. Intuitively, the less the agents
are willing to shift resources intertemporally, the smaller the possibility of alter-
native converging paths to the BGP. Alternatively, if σ < 1, a low enough output
elasticity of human capital in education (η) is sufficient for a determinate BGP.
It implies that indeterminacy cannot emerge if η is too low because of decreasing
private returns to scale in education, a feature captured in the present model as
opposed to the related literature with η = 1. The intuition comes from the effec-
tiveness of the intersectoral reallocation of human capital: A low output elasticity
of human capital in education hinders this effectiveness, which is necessary for
rationalizing an alternative equilibrium path by accelerating/decelerating human
capital accumulation. Next, we present the condition for indeterminacy:





ΘU2 = ∅ and ΘI2
⋃
ΘU2 = Θ2, such that the BGP is indeterminate if θ ∈ ΘI2,
and there is no converging path to the BGP (an unstable BGP) if θ ∈ ΘU2 .
It is hard to identify general conditions on ΘI2 and ΘU2 for indeterminate and
unstable BGPs as such parameter spaces contain different education technologies.
Thus, we present the results in two cases separately: the case with α = 0 and
η ≤ 1 to focus on the role of decreasing private returns to scale in education;
and the case with η = 1 − α to focus on the role of physical capital inputs in
education.
1.4.1 The case α = 0 and η ≤ 1
This case is the closest to the original Lucas model where physical capital has no
role in the education sector (η = 1). When η < 1, the private returns to scale are
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decreasing in the education sector but the social returns to scale are constant via









= 1 when α = 0.
Here, the difference between the private and social returns to scale comes from
the positive human capital externality in education b(γ) = 1 − η, according to
(1.22). Then, we have
Proposition 4. Given that α = 0, a BGP is determinate if and only if





1− β + γ − σ
)
.
This is a corollary of Proposition 2. When η = 1, the present model becomes
the same as the original Lucas model analyzed in Benhabib and Peril (1994) for
indeterminacy, where the balanced growth rate can be solved analytically from
(1.26). The constraint in the proposition with η = 1, under the condition in
(1.31), generates the same result as Proposition 1 in their paper. Since η ≤ 1, if
σ > γ/(1− β + γ), then the right-hand side of the inequality is always greater,
which is sufficient for a determinate BGP regardless of the size of η. Note that
by Proposition 1 σ > γ/(1− β + γ) is also sufficient for the uniqueness of the
BGP, hence, the BGP is both unique and determinant in this region. However,
if σ ≤ γ/(1− β + γ), then a small enough output elasticity of human capital in
education (η) is necessary and sufficient for a determinate BGP. The sufficient
conditions for indeterminacy are:
Proposition 5. Given that α = 0, a BGP is indeterminate if conditions (i) and
(ii) hold:





1− β + γ − σ
)
,
(ii) η ≥ 1− (γ − β)(1− β)




− γ + (γ − β)(1− β)
.
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Conditions (i) and (ii) for indeterminacy require a high enough output elas-
ticity of human capital in the education sector η (≤ 1) if intertemporal elasticity
is high enough such that σ < γ/(1 − β + γ) (to ensure the RHS of condition
(i) is less than one), and if the role of human capital externalities is larger than
the share of capital γ > β (to ensure the RHS of condition (ii) is less than one).
If η = 1 (constant private returns to scale in education), then the proposition
coincides with Proposition 2(i) in Benhabib and Perli (1994). Thus, the propo-
sition extends the literature for indeterminacy to the case when the education
sector demonstrates decreasing private returns to scale (η < 1). For instance,
the parametrization ρ = 0.05, σ = 0.3, A = 1, B = 0.046, γ = 0.5, β = 0.33,
g∗ = 0.03 and η = 0.95 can be shown to generate an indeterminate BGP. How-
ever, the condition γ > β, as in Benhabib and Perli (1994) and Xie (1994), may
be questionable for empirical plausibility. This can be relaxed in the next case.
1.4.2 The case α > 0 and η = 1− α
In this case, physical capital plays a role and private returns to scale are constant
in the education sector. Now, the existence of a BGP requires negative external-
ities of human capital (due to congestion for instance) in the education sector,
according to (1.22):
b(γ) = 1− (1− α)− α1− β + γ
1− β = −
αγ
1− β < 0 when α > 0.
The necessary and sufficient condition for determinacy in this case is given below:






σ − (1− β + γ)
]






Similar to Proposition 4, the BGP is determinate if and only if the out-
put elasticity of human capital in education is small enough. The condition
σ > γ/(1− β + γ) is also sufficient for determinacy in this case, since then the
right-hand side of the inequality in the proposition is greater than one and thus
the inequality is always satisfied, hence similarly, the BGP is both unique and
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determinate in this region. The conditions for indeterminacy are given below:
Proposition 7. Given that α+ η = 1, a BGP is indeterminate if conditions (i)
and (ii) hold:





σ − (1− β + γ)
]






(ii) γ ≥ 1− β
1 + α− β (β − α).
The result relaxes the constraint on the strength of human capital exter-
nalities in production (γ) for indeterminacy by introducing physical capital in
education (α > 0), as long as the educational output elasticity of human capital
(η) is high enough. Similar to Proposition 5, there is one implicit constraint
σ < γ/(1− β + γ) for η < 1.
As the reliance on the strength of human capital externalities for indeter-
minacy declines, we can construct an extreme case with little deviations from
constant returns to scale in both production and education, yet we are still able
to generate an indeterminate BGP. For instance, if ρ = 0.05, A = 1, B =
0.03, γ = 0.01, β = 0.33, η = 0.68, α = 0.32 and g∗ = 0.03, then both produc-
tion and education sectors demonstrate less than 1% human capital externalities
(positive for production but negative for education). However, these parameters
can be shown to satisfy conditions in Proposition 7 and therefore can engender
indeterminacy, as long as σ is small enough. Though the externalities of human
capital are tiny in both production and education sectors, the externalities are
essential for indeterminacy: Without these externalities, indeterminacy could
never emerge no matter how elastic intertemporal substitution is (not even when
σ = 0).
Though Mino (2001) also finds that a small deviation from constant returns
to scale is able to generate indeterminacy in their model, where all externalities
are positive and sector-specific, and social returns to scale are constant in both
sectors, our result emerges from a model with positive and negative externalities
of average human capital in production and education sectors and with increasing
and decreasing social returns to scale in the two sectors.
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1.5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have studied the existence, multiplicity, and indeterminacy of
BGPs in an extended version of the Lucas model, by taking into consideration sev-
eral plausible factors in education: physical capital, human capital externalities,
and decreasing returns to scale. These extensions lead to several contributions.
First, despite decreasing private or social returns to scale in education, long run
endogenous growth can still be sustainable in the presence of increasing returns
to scale in production via human capital externalities. Also, indeterminacy could
emerge for weaker human capital externalities than found with the original Lucas
model, which eases the concern about whether such strong human capital exter-
nalities for indeterminacy as in the literature are plausible. Moreover, multiple
BGPs arise under decreasing returns to scale in education and increasing returns
to scale in production, given elastic enough intertemporal substitution. The high-
growth BGP accompanies more resources for education and relative abundance
of human capital, whereas the low-growth BGP accompanies less resources for
education. The effects of higher income taxes are dramatically different on the
two BGPs.
The results may help the understanding of diverse development experiences of
nations not only in the short run but also in the long run for empirically plausible
education technologies. The results may also help explain diverse growth perfor-
mance in the same country at different long periods in the absence of fundamental
changes. One common requirement of the results is human capital externalities
with which agents in a large population fail to coordinate for mutually beneficial
actions. One implication of the results is to enhance social coordination for more
investment in human capital for a potential gain in efficiency even though the
returns to scale are decreasing in education.
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Figure 1.1: Multiple BGPs under α = 0.
We calculate the left-hand and right-hand sides of (1.26), under ρ = 0.07, σ = 0.34, A = 1.1,
B = 0.067, γ = 0.45, β = 0.33, η = 0.98 and α = 0, from which we can find that there are two
roots for the equation, between 0 and 0.1.
Figure 1.2: Multiple BGPs under α+ η = 1.
We calculate the left-hand and right-hand sides of (1.26), under ρ = 0.045, σ = 0.28, A = 1.433,
B = 0.022, γ = 0.4, β = 0.33, η = 0.68 and α = 0.32, from which we can find that there are
two roots for the equation, between 0 and 0.1.
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Figure 1.3: Multiple BGPs under α > 0 and α+ η < 1.
We calculate the left-hand and right-hand sides of (1.26), under ρ = 0.05, σ = 0.3, A = 1,
B = 0.0435, γ = 0.6, β = 0.33, η = 0.8 and α = 0.08, from which we can find that there are
two roots for the equation, between 0 and 0.1.















































Figure 1.4: The effects of income taxes on the BGP (the first case)
The parameter values are: ρ = 0.05, σ = 2, A = 1, B = 0.2, γ = 0.1, β = 0.36, η = 0.85 and
α = 0.15.
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Figure 1.5: The effects of income taxes on the BGP (the second case)
The parameter values are: ρ = 0.05, σ = 0.3, A = 1, B = 0.0454, γ = 0.3, β = 0.45, η = 0.9
and α = 0.1.












































Figure 1.6: The effects of income taxes on the BGPs (the mixed case)
The parameter values are: ρ = 0.05, σ = 0.3, A = 2, B = 0.0268, γ = 0.35, β = 0.45, η = 0.79
and α = 0.21.
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Chapter 2
Mobility, social security, savings,
and inequality with two-sided
altruism and uncertain earnings
ability
2.1 Introduction
In the last two decades of the twentieth century, the U.S. personal saving rate de-
clined sharply from 11% to 4%, and both wealth and income inequality increased.
The top decile wealth and income shares increased from 67.2% to 69.7% and from
37.5% to 46.9% respectively (Piketty and Saez, 2014). Over the same period, the
social security program expanded by more than one fifth and intergenerational
mobility declined (Levine and Mazumder, 2002, 2007; Nam, 2004; Aaronson and
Mazumder, 2008; Beller, 2009)1. Over time, average school years of the pop-
ulation steadily increase beyond the secondary level towards the college level
with substantial fees. The increasing portion of youth paying for college educa-
tion certainly strengthens the earnings correlation across generations or weakens
1There are also some empirical studies that find no significant trends of mobility over this
period, such as Lee and Solon (2009) and Hertz (2007). However, the literature has on average
found mobility declining over this period. A recent study by Chetty et al. (2014) finds that
rank-based measures of mobility have remained stable for children born between 1971 and 1993,
but even the oldest of them hasn’t reached age 30 by 2000, so they do not reflect the mobility
change between 1980 and 2000.
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intergenerational earnings mobility. The 1980s revenue-neutral tax reform that
reduced the number of tax brackets to flatten marginal tax rates is another factor
for the decline in intergenerational earnings mobility. According to the empirical
findings by Maki and Palumbo (2001), saving rates over the 1990s declined for
households in the top two income quintiles yet rose for those in the bottom two
quintiles, when the intergenerational elasticity of earnings (IGE) rose from 0.464
to 0.571 according to Aaronson and Mazumder (2008). It is then of interest to
ask: How do households with different wealth and earnings respond to changes
in social security and intergenerational mobility in terms of saving and inter-
generational transfer decisions? Can these responses account for the trends in
aggregate savings and wealth and income distributions in data?
Such questions are typically approached in life-cycle models or dynastic mod-
els with downward altruism. In this paper we attempt to explore the answers
in a dynastic family model with two-sided altruism among two overlapping gen-
erations, working and retired, and with uncertain earnings ability. They make
collective decisions on consumption, savings and transfers, which are either from
old parents to adult children or the other way around. Each working-aged agent
draws a level of labor efficiency (earnings ability) from a given distribution, which
is positively correlated with the ability of the parent. Intergenerational trans-
fers motivated by two-sided altruism play a role of “family insurance”, since they
are made after the earning ability of children are realized. Savings, on the other
hand, are made ex-ante during the working age, depending on the conditional ex-
pectation of the next generation’s earnings given the worker’s own earnings. This
correlation of earnings across generations links the responses of savings and inter-
generational transfers to changes in social security and intergenerational earnings
mobility together and differentiates the responses by earnings and by wealth.
We find several results as follows. First, the responses of households to a rise
in social security differ by earnings across the overlapping generations. House-
holds whose increase in the social security contribution from the young agent
are not fully compensated by the increase in the social security benefits received
by the old agent decrease their savings, and the remaining households increase
their savings. This result is different to the Ricardian equivalence in conventional
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dynastic family models (Barro, 1974). At the same time, the response of private
transfers from the old to the young is always positive as in a typical dynastic
model for all households, but the response depends not only on the expectation
of the earnings of the unborn generation but also on the realized earnings of
the overlapping old and young agents. Without consideration of the elderly in
a typical dynastic model, young parents would only leave more bequests to the
unborn children to counteract the expected increased future tax burden of the
PAYG social security contribution on children. When private transfers also occur
between overlapping old parents and adult children in the present model, they
compare the social security contribution from adult children with the benefits
to old parents. Thus, the effect of social security on aggregate savings interacts
with mobility when earnings across generations are correlated.
The responses of savings to a rise in the IGE (i.e. a decline in intergener-
ational mobility) are also heterogeneous across households. Those with high-
earning adult children decrease their savings but the rest reacts oppositely. The
intuition is that the higher persistence of earnings across generations is a bless-
ing to the current high-earning households but a curse to the rest. Expecting
a higher likelihood of a continued success (poverty trap) for future generations,
the incentive to save decreases (increases) for households currently receiving high
(low) earnings. This is consistent with the aforementioned finding by Maki and
Palumbo (2001) during a time with a rising IGE. Intergenerational transfers move
along the same direction as savings, and the magnitude is always smaller than
that of savings, as old parents share the “blessing” or “curse” with their children,
and therefore they transfer more (less) to their children if the latter has to save
more (less).
Calibrated to match a relatively small set of moments for the U.S. economy in
2000, the model generates a wealth distribution that is much more concentrated
than the labor earnings distribution, which in turn is more concentrated than
the income distribution. Comparing among the models, the life-cycle features
improve the fitting of the wealth distribution to data, and the two-sided altruism
does a better job than the one-sided downward altruism. The expansion of social
security from 1980 to 2000 decreases aggregate savings by 11%, and increases
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the Gini coefficient for wealth from .766 to .780. An economy with the same
earnings distribution as in 2000 but higher mobility as in 1980 has 38% higher
aggregate savings and a more equal wealth distribution. Roughly half of the
effect on wealth inequality is due to a direct accumulation effect and the rest is
attributed to the household saving responses to mobility. Calibrated to match
the earnings distributions, social security and mobility in 1980 and 2000, the
model can explain more than half of the fall in the domestic savings and the rises
of wealth and income inequality in data.
2.1.1 Contributions with respect to the literature
The existing literature mainly focuses on the effects of wealth and/or income
inequality on intergenerational mobility through the channel of childhood edu-
cation. The present paper attempts to examine the opposite direction: How do
changes in mobility due to some other social-economic reasons affect the house-
hold’s saving decisions and the aggregate wealth and income inequality. And
in terms of the methodology, the present paper adopts a two-sided altruism ap-
proach instead of one-sided downward altruism that are commonly used in the
literature, and this paper uses a dynastic model with life-cycle features instead
of a pure dynastic or overlapping-generation model.
The pioneer work by Becker and Tomes (1979) demonstrates the impor-
tant role of inheritable genetic and cultural endowment between generations on
the intergenerational income correlation and cross-sectional income distribution,
through the channel of parents’ decisions of investing on children’s human capital.
Later, in their 1986’s work, ex-ante bequest decisions are incorporated into the
model, and they explain the highly concentrated bequests of assets by showing
that lower- and middle-income parents “bequeath” mainly in the form of human
capital investment.
The present paper complements the study of family decisions and intergener-
ational mobility in the literature by examining the saving and transfer decisions
during the working age and after retirement, as opposed to the focus on child-
hood education.2 The present model provides another explanation of the highly
2See, among others, Galor and Tsiddon (1997), Owen and Weil (1998), Fernandez and
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concentrated bequests through the channels of the two-sided altruism and the
regress-to-the-mean earnings process. The different timing for ex-ante saving
and ex-post transferring is carefully studied, as Becker and Tomes (1979) point
out: “parents may have to commit most of their investments before they know a
great deal about their children’s market luck”. Also, the present work attempts
to study the effects of mobility on aggregate savings and wealth/income distri-
butions through ex-ante savings during the working age and ex-post transfers in
the old age of altruistic agents in dynastic families.
The two-sided full altruism in our model follows Laitner (1992), in which,
however, labor efficiency is i.i.d. between generations in the same family. We
consider the persistence of labor efficiency within the family and examine its
effect on savings and inequality. Though a positive IGE is also incorporated in
Fuster et al. (2003, 2007) into a Laitner-type household’s problem, their focus is
on the reasons for the elimination of social security.
There is an extensive literature on the wealth distribution, using dynastic
models (see, e.g., Aiyagari, 1994; Krusell and Smith, 1998; Quadrini, 2000),
life-cycle models (see, e.g., Davies, 1982; Huggett, 1996; De Nardi, 2004), or
dynastic models with life-cycle features (see, e.g., Laitner, 2001; Nishiyama, 2002;
Castaneda et al., 2003). A review of the literature can be found in Cagetti and
De Nardi (2008). Complementing the literature, the present paper shows that
full two-sided altruism for ex-post private intergenerational transfers can also
generate a wealth distribution close to data, without specific assumptions on
preference heterogeneity or entrepreneurial choices. In particular, it demonstrates
the roles of life-cycles and two-sided transfers in generating a more unequal wealth
distribution, compared with a pure dynastic model without life-cycle features that
restricts transfers from parents to children only.
The two-sided altruism between generations is supported by empirical find-
ings. On the one hand, parental support of young adult sons is responsive to
children’s current and anticipated earnings (e.g. Tomes, 1981; Rosenzweig and
Wolpin, 1993; Laitner and Juster, 1996; Altonji et al., 1997). On the other hand,
Rogerson (1998), Maoz and Moav (1999), Hassler and Rodriguez Mora (2000), Benabou (2001),
Solon (2004), Hassler et al. (2007), and Arawatari and Ono (2013).
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adult children’s support to old parents is positively related to their own educa-
tion or income but negatively related to the social-economic status of old parents
(e.g. Hogan et al., 1993; Lee et al., 1994; Sun, 2002).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 describes the model
and examines household responses to changes in state variables analytically. Sec-
tion 2.3 calibrates the model and presents the simulation results. Section 2.4
conducts counter-factual experiments. The last section concludes the paper.
2.2 Model
The economy consists of households and firms in an infinite horizon with discrete
periods.
2.2.1 Households
There is a unit mass of families with overlapping young (working) and old (re-
tired) agents in each period. At the end of each period, the young agent turns old
and a new young agent enters the family. The old-age longevity is no longer than
one period, 0 < T ≤ 1, so the total lifetime is 1 + T for all agents. In the young
period, each agent receives an idiosyncratic labor efficiency shock which deter-
mines his labor income (earnings); in the old period, he receives social security
benefits, which are financed by a uniform PAYG labor income tax.
The budget constraint of an old agent in period t with his asset at and his
labor efficiency when young lyt−1 is
Tdt + bt = (1 + rt)at + T · Tr(wt−1lyt−1), (2.1)
where dt is the old agent’s consumption per unit time; Tr(wt−1l
y
t−1) is the social
security benefits for the old agent per unit time which depends on his earnings
when young; wt and rt are the wage and interest rates, respectively; a positive
(negative) bt refers to the transfer from the parent to the child (from the child
to the parent).
Moreover, the budget constraint for the young agent in the family with the
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transfer from the old bt and his own labor efficiency l
y
t is
ct + at+1 = (1− τss)wtlyt + bt, (2.2)
where ct is the young agent’s consumption per unit time, at+1 ≡ st is his saving
this period which is also his asset next period, τss is the PAYG social security
contribution (tax) rate.
The two generations in a family are mutually fully altruistic and share the
dynastic welfare3:
V (at, lt−1, lt) = max
ct,dt,b,at+1
{αTu(dt) + u(ct) + βEt [V (at+1, lt, lt+1) | lt]} ,
(2.3)
subject to (2.1), (2.2), ct ≥ 0, dt ≥ 0, and at+1 ≥ 0, where α > 0 and 0 <
β < 1 are relative taste parameters. It is assumed here that there is a borrowing
constraint: households cannot hold negative net assets in any period.
We can also combine the two budget constraints as
ct + Tdt + at+1 = (1 + rt)at + T · Tr(wt−1lt−1) + (1− τss)wtlt. (2.4)
A household’s total resources available are the sum of the household’s asset (after
interest), the old agent’s social security benefits and the young agent’s after-tax
earnings. The resources can be pooled by the overlapping agents in the family
and connected to future generations through transfers.
2.2.2 Household responses to changes in state variables
Define Ωt a vector of all the household’s state variables outside at. The recursive
household’s problem is formulated as
V (at,Ωt) = max
at+1,bt
{αTu ([(1 + rt)at + T · Tr(wt−1lt−1)− bt] /T ) +
u (bt + (1− τss)wtlt − at+1) + βE [V (at+1,Ωt+1) | lt]} (2.5)
3Superscripts over labor efficiency are dropped as it does not cause confusion: lt denotes
the labor efficiency for the young agent in period t.
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for non-negative assets at+1 and consumption for the young and the old agents.
The first-order conditions are:
at+1 : at+1
{
u′ (bt + (1− τss)wtlt − at+1)− βE [Va(at+1,Ωt+1)|lt]
}
= 0, (2.6)
where at+1 ≥ 0 and u′ (bt + (1− τss)wtlt − at+1) ≥ βE [Va(at+1,Ωt+1)|lt], and
bt : u
′ (bt + (1− τss)wtlt − at+1)
= αu′ ([(1 + rt)at + T · Tr(wt−1lt−1)− bt] /T ) . (2.7)
The weighted marginal utility of consumption is even for the co-existing young
and old agents, and the marginal cost of savings should be equal to the discounted
expected marginal benefit from the next period if savings are not bounded by
the borrowing constraint (at+1 > 0).
The binding first-order conditions in (2.6) and (2.7) can be used to find the
responses of savings and transfers to changes in state variables. Our analytical ap-
proach will yield more general results than the numerical investigations in existing
dynastic models, particularly with two-sided altruism. The first-order conditions
implicitly determine policy functions bt = b(at,Ωt) and at+1 = g(at,Ωt). The
envelope theorem determines Va(at,Ωt) = α(1 + rt)u′(dt) > 0 and Vaa(at,Ωt) =
α(1 + rt)
2u′′(dt)/T < 0. The following analysis assume that at+1 > 0.
2.2.2.1 Responses to a rise in assets
The effects of a rise in at on savings and intergenerational transfers are determined









where H is the Hessian matrix
H =
u′′(ct) + βE [Vaa(at+1,Ωt+1)|lt] −u′′(ct)
−u′′(ct) u′′(ct) + αu′′(dt)T−1
 .
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> 0, a dynastic family with more asset at to begin with saves more and transfers















u′′(ct) + βE [Vaa(at+1,Ωt+1)|lt] 0
−u′′(ct) α(1 + rt)u′′(dt)T−1
 > 0.
This result is intuitive and useful for comparisons of savings and transfers
across households with different levels of assets. Holding the social security con-
tribution rate constant, the effects of an exogenous increase of social security
benefits or other exogenous government transfers on savings and transfers share
the same signs as those of a rise in at, as households do not distinguish between
the funds available from assets and social security benefits when they make de-
cisions.
2.2.2.2 Responses to a rise in the wage rate
The effects of a rise in the wage rate wt on savings and transfers are determined






−(1− τss)ltu′′(ct) + αu′′(dt)∂Tr(wt−1lt−1)/∂wt
 ,
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where ∂Tr(wt−1lt−1)/∂wt > 0 as the PAYG social security benefits increase when
average wage increases given the same contribution rate, which leads to
gwt(at,Ωt)
=








αu′′(dt)u′′(ct)∂Tr(wt−1lt−1)/∂wt + βE [Vaa(at+1,Ωt+1)|lt]
· [−(1− τss)ltu′′(ct) + αu′′(dt)∂Tr(wt−1lt−1)/∂wt]} .
The positive response of savings is straightforward, as increases in both the
young agent’s after-tax earnings and the old agent’s social security benefits
strengthen the incentive to save for future generations. However, the response of
the transfers is not so clear-cut. On the one hand, the rise in the young agent’s
after-tax earnings suppresses the old agent’s motive for transfers to the young.
On the other hand, the simultaneous rise in the old agent’s social security ben-
efits strengthens the motive for transfers to the future generations. Therefore,
transfers to the young are more likely to decline if the rise in the after-tax income
for the young is much larger than the rise in the benefits for the elderly. However,
transfers to the young may actually increase if the economy runs a large social
security program but the young agent has a very low level of labor efficiency,
because in this case the increase in the social security benefits dominates.
2.2.2.3 Responses to a rise in the interest rate
The effects of a rise in the interest rate rt+1 are determined by differentiating the

















−βαE [u′(dt+1) + (1 + rt+1)u′′(dt+1)at+1T−1 | lt]u′′(ct)
det (H)
.
Both responses depend on the sign of the term E [· · · ], consisting of the ex-
pected substitution and income effects. The former effect strengthens the incen-
tive to save as the return to savings increases, whereas the latter stimulates more
consumption this period and hence weakens the incentive to save. Intergenera-
tional transfers co-move with savings, as parents share the decrease (increase) of
the current period consumption with their children if savings are to be increased
(decreased). Therefore, the present model generates a unique channel connecting
intergenerational transfers with the interest rate.
2.2.2.4 Responses to a rise in old-age longevity
The effects of an exogenous rise in T (for the current old generation only), are








(1 + rt)at − T 2∂Tr(wt−1lt−1)/∂T − bt
]
 ,




(1 + rt)at − T 2∂Tr(wt−1lt−1)/∂T − bt
]





(1 + rt)at − T 2∂Tr(wt−1lt−1)/∂T − bt
]
T 2 det (H)
· {u′′(ct) + βE [Vaa(at+1,Ωt+1)|lt]} < 0.
Otherwise, gT (at,Ωt) > 0 and bT (at,Ωt) > 0. Here, ∂Tr(wt−1lt−1)/∂T < 0
because social security annuity for longer retirement time has to fall given the
same contribution rate τss. Intuitively, a rise in longevity induces the family
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to spend more resources for the elderly through reducing savings and transfers,
unless a family starts from very little assets and leaves bequests out of social
security income. In these asset-poor families leaving bequests, the young agent
must be of very low labor income according to (2.7), and thus the asset-poor
elderly with longer life leaves more bequests to the young. These results are
different from those in the literature where transfer decisions are made ex-ante.
2.2.2.5 Responses to a rise in social security contribution
The effects of a rise in the social security contribution rate τss, which also raises

























The response of savings to a rise in the social security contribution differs
among households. It is signed by the term T∂Tr(wt−1lt−1)/∂τss − wtlt, the
marginal gain of social security benefits to the elderly minus the marginal loss
of after-tax earnings to the young. Therefore, controlling an old agent’s labor
efficiency, households with high-earning young agents are likely to reduce their
savings, while those with low-earning young agents are likely to increase their
savings. For example, if we assume a uniform social security benefit T¯r for all
old agents, making use of the budget balance of the social security program, then
T∂T¯r/∂τss − wtlt = wt l¯ − wtlt implies that households earning less (more) than
average save more (less) in response to a rise in the social security contribution
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rate. In general, the response depends on the combination of the parent’s and the
child’s labor efficiency: Households experiencing an upward mobility are more
likely to reduce their savings, as the current young generation contributes more
to social security than what their old parents receive. Therefore, the change of
mobility may have an impact on the effect of social security on aggregate savings,
as mobility determines the likelihoods of different labor efficiency combinations
across old parents and children, which will be shown numerically in Section 2.4.1.
This mixed savings effect of social security differs not only from the typical
Ricardian equivalence hypothesis in a standard dynastic model with downward
altruism (Barro, 1974), but also from the negative saving effect of social security
in a life-cycle model, in which the young, who does not care for the elderly
parent’s welfare, only recognizes a shift of income from the young to the old
age in the life-cycle. At the same time, the response of transfers from the old
to the young is always positive as in a dynastic model. However, without the
consideration of the elderly, it is the young parent in a typical dynastic model
who leaves more bequests ex-ante to counteract the expected increased future
tax burden of a greater PAYG social security contribution on the child. In the
current model, it is the old parent who transfers more to the young adult when
the latter’s increased tax burden is realized.
2.2.2.6 Responses to a rise in young agent’s labor efficiency
Here onwards, we make the following assumption on the labor efficiency:
Assumption 1. The logarithm of the labor efficiency shock follows an AR(1)
process between generations, ln(lt) = λ ln(lt−1) + t, t ∼ N(0, σ2 ).
Here, λ is the intergenerational elasticity of earnings (IGE). Then, the effects
















where Valt(at+1,Ωt+1) = α(1+rt+1)u′′(dt+1)∂Tr(wtlt)/∂lt < 0 is a negative effect
of higher labor efficiency on the marginal benefit of savings through increased
social security benefits, and Valt+1(at+1,Ωt+1) = (1+rt+1)u′′(ct+1)(1−τss)wt+1 <
0 is a negative effect of expecting higher labor efficiency for the next generation on
the marginal benefit of savings through intergenerational earnings correlations.
In addition, there is a positive income effect of higher labor efficiency on savings
through −u′′(ct)(1 − τss)wt. Higher labor efficiency for the young also weakens
the incentive for transfers from the old.





























The net effect on savings is only positive when the income effect of higher labor
efficiency dominates. This result differs from that of a dynastic model with
i.i.d. labor efficiency for each generation (λ = 0) or if social security benefits
are uniform. The negative effect of higher labor efficiency lt for the young on
transfers from the old is intuitive and is also related to the IGE. This is consistent
with the empirical finding that parental support of young adult sons is responsive
to children’s current and anticipated earnings mentioned in the introduction.
2.2.2.7 Responses to a rise in IGE
























As the responses of both savings and transfers depend on the sign of − ln lt,
both of them increase (decrease) for households whose young agents earn less
(more) than the median earner, as ln lt = λ ln lt−1+t, t ∼ N(0, σ2 ) implies that
the stationary distribution of earnings is log-normal: ln l∞ ∼ N
(
0, σ2 /(1− λ2)
)
.
Higher persistence of earnings along generations is a blessing to high-earning
households but a curse to the rest. High-earning households choose to save
less than before, as the conditional expectation of their next generation’s labor
earnings increases. However, the opposite is true to low-earning households.
Unlike the effect of social security on savings, the effect of higher IGE on savings
only depends on the current young generation’s efficiency, which solely determines
whether this change is a gain or loss to the family. Transfers from the old to the
young move along the same direction as savings and the magnitude is always
smaller than that of savings, as old agents share the blessing or curse with the
young agent by transferring more (less) to young agents if the latter has to save
more (less).
2.2.3 Firms
There is just one type of good produced in the economy, according to a Cobb-
Douglas production function F (K, L) = AKθL1−θ, where K is the aggregate
capital, L is the aggregate labor efficiency and A is the total factor productiv-
ity. The capital market is open, and thus competitive firms can borrow at an
exogenous international interest rate r. However, the labor market is closed.
Capital depreciates fully in one period. As a result, the capital-labor ratio K/L
is exogenously determined and so is the wage rate w:
r = θA(K/L)θ−1 − 1, (2.8)
w = (1− θ)A(K/L)θ. (2.9)
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This is supported by the stylized fact that the capital-output ratio is roughly
constant over long periods of time (Kaldor, 1961), and consistent with the fact
that, though the personal saving rate declined sharply from 1980 to 2000, gross
capital formation and the real interest rate remained stable in countries like the
United States; meanwhile, the international debt position rose significantly over
the period, as illustrated in Figure 2.1.
2.2.4 The stationary equilibrium
A stationary equilibrium is a collection of prices {r, w}, a value function V (·),
household policy rules {g(·), b(·)}, a measure Ψ(·) on household states (at, lt−1, lt),
and the social security tax rate τss and transfer scheme Tr(·), such that:
1. Given {r, w, τss, Tr(·)}, {g(·), b(·)} and V (·) solve the household’s dy-
namic programming problem in (2.5);
2. Given r, the capital-labor ratio K/L and the wage rate w are determined
by the firm’s profit maximization conditions in (2.8)-(2.9);





where Ψl is the marginal distribution of l.





5. The households measure Ψ(at, lt−1, lt) is invariant, when households
evolve according to their policy rules and the transition of efficiency shocks.
2.3 Simulations
2.3.1 Calibration
The stationary equilibrium is calibrated to the U.S. economy in 2000. We assume
that each period in the model is 40 years: the young period represents 25-64 years
of age and the old period is after 65 years old. As life expectancy at age 65 is 17.6
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years in 2000 (National Center for Health Statistics), we set T=17.6/40=0.44.
The social security tax rate is 12.4% in 2000 (Social Security Administration),
so we set τss = 0.124. Following Fuster et al. (2007), the social security transfer
scheme Tr(·) is calibrated to match the marginal replacement rates listed in
their paper, and we rescale proportionally the wage base used for calculating the
benefits so that the program is self-financing.
We take θ, the capital’s share of output, to be 0.36 according to Cooley and
Prescott (1995). We calibrate output and capital to match the GDP per capita
and the investment-output ratio in data. The interest rate r is calculated by
(1 + r)K = θY from the Cobb-Douglas production function. Moreover, the
total factor productivity, A, can be determined from the production technology,
after the aggregate labor input is calculated from the stationary distribution
of labor efficiency. Instantaneous utility is assumed to follow a CRRA form:
u(c) = (c1−σ−1)/(1−σ). We take the relative risk aversion coefficient σ to be 2,
which falls in the range commonly used in the literature. The weight of the old
agent in the household’s problem, α, is calibrated by the first-order condition in
(2.7) to match the ratio between the annual consumption of people aged 25-64
and over 65 (the U.S. Census). The time discount rate β is calibrated to match
the average household net worth (the U.S. Census).
Labor efficiency across generations follows anAR(1) process: ln lt = λ ln lt−1+
t, t ∼ N(0, σ2 ) as in Assumption 1. Using the method introduced in Tauchen
(1986), we discretize the distribution into five states, from the lowest to the
highest are l1 to l5, and l3 is the median, and then we calculate the transition
probabilities between them. λ is set to 0.571, according to the IGE estimate
for 2000 in Aaronson and Mazumder (2008), using 35- to 44-year-olds only as
a proxy for the intergenerational elasticity of earnings ability. σ is calibrated
so that the stationary earnings distribution matches the Gini coefficient of long-
term earnings for 1999 (2000 is not available) in Kopczuk et al. (2010). The
long-term rather than the yearly Gini coefficient is used as a more accurate mea-
sure of the earnings ability distribution as the former should be less affected by
business cycles. In summary, parameters are calibrated according to Table 2.1.
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2.3.2 The benchmark simulation
The value function and the policy functions for savings and transfers in (2.5) are
found by discretizing the asset space and updating the value and policy func-
tions by the Bellman equation, until the differences between iterations are small
enough. We make use of the first-order condition in (2.7) to reduce the control
variables of the maximization in each iteration to just at+1, which significantly
improves the robustness and speed of finding the maximizer numerically in each
iteration. After value and policy functions are found, a large number of dynastic
families are simulated. Starting with the same asset and labor efficiency, house-
hold assets and labor efficiency are updated each period according to the policy
function for savings and the AR(1) process of labor efficiency respectively, until
the wealth distribution in the economy gets stationary, indicated by the moments
of the distribution close enough between iterations.
From the household’s problem, the difference between funds from assets and
from social security benefits does not play a role in the transfer and saving deci-
sions. Therefore, we can present the value function and the policy functions more
conveniently by combining the first two state variables in (2.3) and replace them
with mt ≡ (1+r)at+T ·Tr(wlt−1), which are the total resources available for the
old agent in the household. Solving the model numerically, the value function (as
in Figure 2.2) and the policy functions (as in Figure 2.3 and Figure 2.4) can be
found. The value function is strictly increasing and concave for each efficiency
state. Those with higher efficiency have higher values for several reasons. Young
agents with higher efficiency receive more labor earnings when young and will
enjoy more social security benefits when old. Also, as labor efficiency is positively
correlated across generations, the chance of drawing relatively high efficiency is
higher for the next generation, given that the current generation draws a high
efficiency.
Consistent with the findings in Section 2.2.2.1 and 2.2.2.6, transfers to chil-
dren are larger for wealthier households or if children’s labor efficiency is low.
These results are consistent with the empirical finding that parental support of
young adult sons is positively related to parents’ income or net worth and neg-
atively related to children’s current and anticipated earnings (e.g. Tomes, 1981;
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Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1993; Laitner and Juster, 1996; Altonji et al., 1997).
Note that transfers to children could be negative for those old agents who have
saved little in the young period but their children happen to have very high
earnings, in which case altruistic adult children find it rational to provide net fi-
nancial support to old parents. This is consistent with the empirical finding that
adult children’s support to old parents is positively related to adult children’s
education or income but negatively related to the social-economic status of old
parents, such as in Hogan et al. (1993) and Lee et al. (1994).
Wealthier households save more controlling earnings of young agents. How-
ever, consistent with the analysis in Section 2.2.2.6, we find that households with
higher-earnings for young agents do not necessarily save more. In particular,
households with the lowest-earning young agents in fact save more than those
with higher-earning young agents. One reason of this is that as social security’s
marginal replacement rate is the highest for the lowest earners, it is more likely
that the negative effect on savings due to higher social security benefits when old
dominates for those households, when the young agent’s labor efficiency increases.
In spite of a relatively small set of aggregate moments matched to, the sim-
ulation produces wealth and income distributions close to data in general. The
wealth and income distributions from the simulation are compared with data in
Table 2.2. Consistent with empirical findings, the simulation generates a dis-
tribution of wealth more concentrated than that of labor earnings, which is in
turn more concentrated than that of household income. However, as Table 2.2
shows, the simulation over-estimates the number of households with zero assets
but we find that increasing the number of grids on the state space alleviates this
problem. The simulation also generates an extremely unequal distribution of
transfers, from which we find that 42% of households experience negative trans-
fers to the young (adult children provide net financial support to old parents).
This is consistent with the estimate by Hurd and Smith (2002) that more than
40% of children receive nothing from deceased parents, if we assume that old
parents receiving net financial support from adult children leave no bequests.
We compare the simulated wealth distribution of our model with those of
other models in Table 2.3. Using the IGE found from data, a pure dynastic model
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without life-cycle features (as in Appendix B) generates a wealth distribution
much more unequal than the Aiyagari (1994) model. However, in such models
savings are all transferred to the next generation, which requires the bequest
(transfer) distribution to be the same as the wealth distribution, which is not
consistent with the empirical finding that the bequest distribution is even more
unequal than the wealth distribution (Hurd and Smith, 2002). Incorporating
life-cycle features but only one-sided transfers from parents to children improves
to some extent the fitting of this simulated wealth distribution to data. The
fitting improves further once we allow for two-sided transfers as in our model:
the wealth distribution is more skewed as low-earning agents can partially rely
on their descendants to finance their expenditures when old.
2.4 Counter-factual experiments
2.4.1 The effects of social security
To examine social security’s effects on aggregate savings and wealth/income dis-
tributions, we decrease the social security tax rate from 12.4% in 2000 to 10.16%
in 1980, and find that aggregate savings are 12% higher and the Gini coefficient
for wealth decrease from 0.780 to 0.766. In other words, as social security ex-
pands from 1980 to 2000, aggregate savings decrease by 11% and the wealth Gini
rises from 0.766 to 0.780 (Table 2.4).
However, the result here arises not through the channel of life-cycle savings.
As it can be found from the combined budget constraint in (2.4), without the
heterogeneity of labor efficiency, social security would have no effect on aggregate
savings in the present model, as parents who receive more social security bene-
fits give more bequests immediately to children who now contribute more to the
program. As analyzed in Section 2.2.2.5, household responses to the expansion
of social security are heterogeneous: controlling the old agent’s efficiency, house-
holds with high-earning young agents are likely to reduce their savings, while
those with low-earning young agents are likely to increase their savings; however,
the responses of transfers to the young are positive for all households (Figure
2.5).
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Distribution wise, we compare the average wealth by quintiles in the two
scenarios, and find that the relative decrease of wealth is largest for the middle
quintile and much milder for the top quintile, though the top quintile is the
largest contributor in absolute values to the decrease of aggregate savings (Table
2.5), which causes a more unequal wealth distribution. Since social security is
re-distributional with a uniform tax rate yet a decreasing marginal replacement
rate, its effect is negligible on the before-tax income inequality but it reduces the
after-tax income inequality (Table 2.4). In summary, our model finds that social
security may have opposite effects on wealth and after-tax income inequality.
To investigate the effect of social security on savings under different mobility
environments, we conduct the same experiment under a perfectly mobile economy
(IGE=0). We find that the absolute decrease of aggregate savings is 5% larger in
a highly mobile society than in the U.S. economy in 2000. The intuition is related
to the household responses to a larger social security contribution rate in Section
2.2.2.5. High-earning young agents are now more likely to be sons of medium-
or low-earning parents. We have seen that the increase in the social security
contribution is likely to dominate the increase in benefits in such households,
therefore their savings decrease. Although the opposite is true to low-earning
households, high-earning households are the heavy savers and therefore their
impact on aggregate savings is likely to dominate.
2.4.2 The effects of intergenerational mobility
To examine the effects of immobility on aggregate savings and wealth distri-
bution, we reduce the IGE from 0.571 in 2000 to 0.318 in 1980 as found by
Aaronson and Mazumder (2008), keeping the stationary earnings distribution
the same as before. We can achieve this by reducing λ in the AR(1) process
of the log earnings, while adjusting σ accordingly such that the variance of the
stationary distribution of log earnings, which equals σ2 /(1 − λ2), remains the
same as before. Therefore, this is a counter-factual experiment to compare with
an economy that is identical to the U.S. economy in 2000 except for a lower IGE
at the 1980’s level.
We find that aggregate savings are 38% higher in the economy with mobility
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at the 1980’s level and the Gini coefficient of wealth decreases from 0.780 to
0.721. In other words, as mobility decreases from the 1980’s level to the 2000’s
level, aggregate savings decrease by 28% and the wealth Gini rises from 0.721 to
0.780 (Table 2.4). Consistent with the analysis of household responses in Section
2.2.2.7, savings increase (decrease) for young agents who earn less (more) than
the median earner, and transfers from the old to the young move in the same
direction as savings (Figure 2.6 where lt = l3 is the median labor efficiency), as
the economy’s mobility decreases. It can also be found from the figure that the
absolute change of the high earners clearly dominates that of the low earners.
On aggregate, the decrease from high-earning households dominates the increase
from low-earning households and the net effect is a decrease of aggregate savings.
As shown in Table 2.6, the contribution to the absolute decrease of aggregate
savings rises with wealth quintiles, though the relative decrease of wealth are
actually the largest for the second and third quintiles.
The effect on wealth inequality is two-fold. There is a direct effect: lower
mobility raises the chance of consecutive generations of low (high) earnings and
therefore the likelihood of extreme low (high) wealth. There is also an indirect
effect: the change of saving decisions alters the wealth distribution as well. To
separate out the direct effect, we conduct another sub-experiment: we reduce the
IGE to the 1980’s level while keeping the household’s policy functions the same
as in 2000. We find that the direct effect predicts the opposite direction of the
change of aggregate savings and it reduces the Gini coefficient from 0.780 to 0.753.
Therefore, the indirect effect reduces the Gini coefficient further from 0.753 to
0.721 (Table 2.4). This means that if we estimate the effects of intergenerational
mobility on aggregate savings and the wealth distribution without modeling the
response of saving behaviors, using a “warm glow” bequest motive for instance,
then we could have made the opposite prediction on savings and under-estimated
the inequality change by more than one half in this case.
2.4.3 A comparison of the U.S. economy in 1980 and 2000
Finally, we simulate the model with the 1980’s IGE, social security, earnings
distribution, and life expectancy at age 65, and compare it with the U.S. economy
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in 2000. Major indicators are summarized in Table 2.7. Over the twenty years,
the model finds several results: Aggregate savings shrink by 15.9% and the gross
saving rate falls from 14.5% to 11.9%; wealth inequality rises and the top wealth
quintile share rises from 74% to 81%; income inequality also rises and the top
income quintile share rises from 48.6% to 52.0%. Compared with data, they
are consistent with the trends of the gross saving rate and the wealth/income
distributions. While the model explains largely the change of wealth inequality,
the extent of the rise of income inequality is still much smaller than in data, which
suggests that there are other factors besides the wealth distribution contributing
to the rise of income inequality.
Aggregate savings decrease as high-earning households, who are the heavy
savers, decrease their savings in response to the decrease in mobility and the
expansion of social security (Figure 2.7). However, there is also a positive effect
on aggregate savings from the rise of earnings inequality. As the variability of
earnings gets larger, the proportion of super high earners increases, who are
also the large contributors to aggregate savings. This explains why the negative
effect on aggregate savings is smaller than in Section 2.4.2, where the earnings
distribution is kept the same.
Wealth becomes more unequally distributed since the relative decrease of
wealth is largest for the second and third quintiles, though the largest contrib-
utors to the aggregate change are the top two quintiles (Table 2.8). The rises
of both labor earnings and wealth inequality contribute to the rise of income
inequality, and they dominate the reallocation effect of a larger social security
program.
2.5 Conclusion
The results in the present paper shed some lights on the effects of lower intergener-
ational mobility and larger social security on aggregate savings and wealth/income
inequality in a dynastic model with two-sided full altruism. We find that house-
hold responses to changes in intergenerational mobility and social security are
both heterogeneous: When mobility falls, high-earning households reduce sav-
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ings while low-earning households raise savings; when social security expands,
households experiencing upward (downward) mobility between generations tend
to reduce (raise) savings. The counter-factual simulations find that falling mo-
bility and expanding social security can explain more than half of both the fall in
domestic savings and the rises of wealth and income inequality from 1980 to 2000.
The theoretical framework of this paper is rich and can be used to answer dif-
ferent types of questions. More counter-factual analysis and some cross-country
comparisons can be done for future research.
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Table 2.1: Calibration of parameters
Parameter Value Reference/Moment to match
T 0.44 Life expectancy at age 65
τss 0.124 Social Security Administration
θ 0.36 Cooley and Prescott (1995)
A 1078.1 GDP per capita
σ 2.0 Commonly used in the literature
α 0.38 Ratio of consumption for 25-64 and 65+
β 0.271 Average household net worth
λ 0.571 Aaronson and Mazumder (2008)
σ2 0.845 Gini coefficient of earnings
Table 2.2: Wealth, income and transfer distributions
Gini coefficient
% of total wealth/income/transfers
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
US wealth data
0.803 -0.3 1.3 5.0 12.2 81.7
Wealth distribution from simulation
0.780 0 0 2.8 15.7 81.5
US income data
0.462 3.6 8.9 14.8 23.0 49.8
Income distribution from simulation
0.482 3.8 8.5 12.1 23.6 52.0
Transfers distribution from simulation
1.497 -38.1 -5.0 3.0 18.6 121.5
Table 2.3: Comparison of simulated wealth distributions
Gini coefficient
% of total wealth
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
US Data
0.803 -0.3 1.3 5.0 12.2 81.7
Aiyagari (1994)
0.380 - - - - 41.0
Without life-cycle features
0.722 0 1.4 4.5 20.6 73.5
One-sided transfers only
0.757 0 0.4 3.8 18.4 77.8
Our model
0.780 0 0 2.8 15.7 81.5
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Table 2.4: The effects of social security/mobility on savings and inequality
Agg. savings Wealth Gini Income Gini After-tax
income Gini
2000’s US economy Benchmark 0.780 0.482 0.476
1980’s social security 12% higher 0.766 0.484 0.486
1980’s mobility 38% higher 0.721 0.462 -
Mobility’s direct effect only 6.3% lower 0.753 0.467 -
Table 2.5: Comparison of economies with 1980’s vs 2000’s social security by
quintiles
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
Average wealth (80) 0 0 721 3557 17076
Average wealth (00) 0 0 536 2987 15496
Absolute change 0 0 -185 -570 -1580
% change - - -25.7% -16.0% -9.3%
Contribution to decrease of agg. savings 0.0% 0.0% 7.9% 24.4% 67.7%
Table 2.6: Comparison of economies with 1980’s vs 2000’s IGE by quintiles
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
Average wealth (80) 0 74 1595 4917 19184
Average wealth (00) 0 0 536 2987 15496
Absolute change 0 -74 -1059 -1930 -3688
% change - -100.0% -66.4% -39.3% -19.2%
Contribution to decrease of agg. savings 0.0% 1.1% 15.7% 28.6% 54.6%
Table 2.7: Comparison of the economy in 1980 vs 2000
Year Agg. Wealth Q5 wealth Income Q5 income Gross domestic
savings Gini share Gini share savings (% GDP)
Data
1980 - .72 74.7% .403 44.1% 22.8%
2000 - .803 81.7% .462 49.8% 19.9%
∆ - +.083 +7.0% +.059 +5.7% -2.9%
Simul.
1980 4529 .718 73.9% .442 48.6% 14.5%
2000 3809 .78 81.5% .482 52.0% 11.9%
∆ -15.9% +.062 +7.6% +.040 +3.4% -2.6%
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Table 2.8: Comparison of the economy in 1980 vs 2000 by quintiles
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
Average wealth (80) 0 191 1278 4526 17002
Average wealth (00) 0 0 536 2987 15496
Absolute change 0 -191 -742 -1539 -1506
% change - -100.0% -58.1% -34.0% -8.9%
Contribution to decrease of agg. savings 0.0% 4.8% 18.7% 38.7% 37.9%
Figure 2.1: Investment, savings, real interest rate and foreign debt position, the
U.S., 1980-2000.
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Figure 2.2: The household’s value function V (mt, lt) for the benchmark calibra-
tion.
Figure 2.3: The household’s saving policy g(mt, lt) for the benchmark calibration.
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Economic growth and health
spending: evidence from oil price
shocks
3.1 Introduction
The drastically rapid rise of health spending is one of the noteworthy trends
in the past few decades. From 1960 to 2009, the share of total health care
expenditures in GDP rose from 5% to 18% in the United States (CMS, 2010);
and in the last decade only, this share rose from 7.7% to 9.5% for OECD countries
(OECD, 2014). Moreover, this trend is not specific to developed economies only.
During 1979-2004, total health expenditures grew at an annual average real rate
of 11% in China - adding on 0.2 percentage points annually to the share of health
spending in GDP (WHO, 2005); and globally, this share increased from 9.2% to
9.7% in 2000-2007 (WHO, 2010) and per capita health spending grew from $562
to $9471 in constant 2005 PPP terms during 1995-2012.
Naturally, economists have great interests in knowing the reasons for such
fast growth in health expenditures globally. Economic growth is often viewed
as a candidate. If a country’s income elasticity of health spending is greater
than one, or health services are luxury goods, then the share of health spending
in GDP will rise as income rises. Hall and Jones (2007) carefully articulates
1The numbers are calculated from WHO Global Health expenditures Database.
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this view and argues that the share of health spending rises when income rises
if marginal utility of consumption diminishes faster than that of life extension.
Getzen (2000) reviews empirical studies to that date and finds that individual
income elasticities of health spending are typically near zero, while elasticities at
the national level are commonly greater than 1.0, and he concludes that “health
care is an individual necessity and a national luxury”.
Most studies that aim at estimating the the income elasticity of health ex-
penditures at the national level use ordinary least squares (OLS) estimations
to analyze relatively small samples of cross-sectional, time-series or panel data2.
However, OLS estimations face a few challenges when trying to establish a causal
relationship between a country’s economic growth and its health expenditures.
The first is a potential reverse causality. As one component in GDP, faster or
slower growth of the health care sector contributes to the changes of economic
growth, which causes upward bias of the elasticity estimate. The second chal-
lenge is an omitted variable bias. For example, large-scale health shocks such
as epidemics can lead to rapid rises in health spending and meantime under-
performance of the macro economy, which causes downward bias of the estimate,
and the shift of population structure can affect both economic growth and health
expenditures too.
For these reasons, this paper adopts an instrumental variable (IV) approach
to re-estimate the effects of economic growth on health expenditures based on a
much larger data sample, by making use of country-year specific oil price shocks,
defined as the interaction of changes in international oil prices with the impor-
tance of oil production in a country’s economy. This strategy is likely to relieve
possible endogeneity bias, and since year-to-year oil price variations are found
to follow a random walk, it captures the permanent income effects of economic
growth on health expenditures. This strategy has been used in Acemoglu et
al. (2013) to study the income elasticity of hospital expenditures in the US at
the local area level, and in Brueckner et al. (2012a, 2012b) and Brueckner and
Schwandt (2014) to study the effects of economic growth on democracy, govern-
ment spending and population respectively. However, the specific form of the
2Please refer to Table 1 in Getzen (2000) for a review of the literature.
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instrument used in this paper differs with those studies. Log differences in oil
prices are used instead of logs as in Acemoglu et al. (2013) to take better care
of the nonstationarity of oil prices. Besides that, proved oil reserves per capita
are used in the benchmark estimation instead of the share of oil net exports in
GDP as in Brueckner et al. (2012a, 2012b) and Brueckner and Schwandt (2014),
to provide an alternative measure of the role of oil in an economy and to address
some concerns of endogeneity bias.
Contrary to what might have been expected, the benchmark estimate for the
coefficient of the GDP per capita growth on the health expenditures per capita
growth is -0.96 with a standard error 0.09, and its 95% confidence interval is
[-1.13, -0.78]. Private and out-of-pocket expenditures on health are more neg-
atively responsive to economic growth than public expenditures. Two possible
explanations are provided, namely an improvement in health by means other
than more health spending and higher opportunity cost of receiving health ser-
vices. The positive (negative) effects of economic growth on adult mortality
rates (life expectancy) suggest that the second explanation is likely to be the
dominant force. Using growth rates over longer horizons, the long-run estimates
remain negative and significant. Various robustness checks are conducted and
the negative effects of economic growth on health expenditures are quite robust.
The benchmark estimate found in this paper differs a lot from Acemoglu et.
al. (2013), which estimates the elasticity to be 0.72 between local area income
and hospital expenditures in the US. One possible source of the difference is
the general equilibrium effect at the national level, which is not captured in
the local-area-level analysis. Note that the estimate is lower at the state level
than at the local-area level in their paper. Another possible source is public
health and policies at the national level. For example, better provision of public
health infrastructures and education as national income rises can potentially
improve public health at a lower cost and reduce health expenditures as a result.
Moreover, the differences in the exact dependent/independent and instrumental
variables used also contribute to the gap. More specifically, their estimates are
lower when using total health expenditures as in this paper in place of hospital
expenditures as in their benchmark estimation, total income in place of payroll,
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or current-year oil price shocks in place of one-year lagged shocks.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section describes the empirical
strategy and data. Section 3.3 presents the main results and Section 3.4 dis-
cusses them. Section 3.5 conducts various robustness checks and the last section
concludes.
3.2 Empirical Strategy and Data
3.2.1 Empirical strategy
The following econometric specification is employed to estimate the effects of
economic growth on health expenditures:
∆ ln(hjt) = αj + γt + β∆ ln(yjt) + jt (3.1)
where αjand γt are country and year fixed effects, ∆ ln(hjt) is the annual change
in the log of real health expenditures per capita, ∆ ln(yjt) is the annual change
in the log of real GDP per capita. The error term, jt, is clustered at the country
level to account for arbitrary within-country serial correlation. Though equation
(3.1) does not include any lags or leads of GDP per capita growth for convenience,
the timing of the effects will be examined in the estimations.
However, due to reasons aforementioned, direct OLS estimates of β are likely
to be biased. To tackle potential endogeneity bias, the changes in GDP per
capita are instrumented by exploiting the differential impact of international oil
price changes on countries in which oil production plays a more or less significant
role in the economy. In particular, ∆ ln(yjt) in (3.1) is instrumented with the
following first-stage estimation:
∆ ln(yjt) = dj + bt + δ · [∆ ln(pt)× Ij ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡oilshockjt
+ ujt (3.2)
where djand bt are country and year fixed effects, pt is the international oil spot
price in year t, and Ij is a (time-invariant) measure of the role of oil production
in the economy. In the baseline specifications, Ij will be proxied by proved oil
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reserves per capita in country j; the share of crude oil net exports in country j’s
GDP will be used as an alternative proxy for a robustness check.
The interaction of the log difference of oil prices in year t with country j’s
proved oil reserves per capita is denoted as the oil price shock to country j in year
t. δ is expected to be positive, as it reflects the wealth effects of higher valuations
of oil reserves and the effects are expected to be larger in more oil-abundant
economies. The individual effects of oil price changes ∆ ln(pt) and oil reserves
per capita Ij on GDP per capita growth ∆ ln(yjt) are absorbed in the time and
country fixed effects respectively. Similar to the second-stage specification, the
timing of the effects of oil price shocks on economic growth will be examined
in the estimations, though equation (3.2) does not include any lags or leads for
simplicity.
Compared to Acemoglu et. al. (2013), the specifications in this paper take
log differences of oil prices, GDP and health expenditures, in order to deal with
the potential nonstationarity of those variables, especially for the time-series oil
prices. As discussed in Hamilton (2009) and Bruckner et al. (2012a), oil prices
display a unit root (the AR(1) coefficient is 0.99). Consequently, year-to-year
variations in oil prices follow a random walk, so the oil price shock instrument
captures the effects of permanent income changes on health expenditures. In-
stead of using the average share of oil net exports in GDP, as in Brueckner et
al. (2012a, 2012b) and Brueckner and Schwandt (2014), this paper uses the
proved oil reserves data as an alternative measure of the role of oil production
in the economy, which should be quite independent with the country’s economic
growth or health expenditure growth during the period and therefore less prone
to potential endogeneity bias.
The identifying assumption is that oil price shocks affect a country’s health
expenditures growth only through the channel of its economic growth. Oil price
shocks have been defined as the interaction of oil price changes and proved oil
reserves per capita. Some might worry about the possible feedback of economic
growth on international oil prices, which can cause endogeneity problems due to
reverse causality and omitted variable bias. To relieve this concern, the bench-
mark estimations exclude both the world’s ten largest oil exporters and ten largest
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oil importers, which account for 60% and 69% of world’s total oil exports and
imports respectively. It should be safe to think that the oil reserve distribution
in the world is independent with health expenditures, however, some may worry
about the technology advances in a country which could affect both oil reserve
explorations and health expenditures. Nonetheless, as the instrument does not
make use of any year-to-year changes in a country’s proved oil reserves, tech-
nology changes across time should not challenge the exclusion restriction of the
instrument.
3.2.2 Data and descriptive statistics
Estimations of equations (3.1) and (3.2) require country-year panel data on health
expenditures and GDP per capita, time-series data on international oil prices, and
cross-country data on oil reserves per capita. Summary statistics are provided
in Table 3.1. The sources and construction of the main data series are described
here.
A. Health expenditures
The panel data on country-level annual health expenditures per capita are from
WHO Global Health Expenditures Database, covering 194 countries for the pe-
riod 1995-2012. One major advantage of this database is its wide coverage of
countries, however, the number of years covered is limited, compared to the
OECD database. The baseline estimations use total health expenditures per
capita growth as the dependent variable, including both public and private spend-
ing on health. In Section 3.3.3 on the contributions to the effects, public, private
and out-of-pocket spending on health will be used as dependent variables. All
data are in constant PPP international dollars. Figure 3.1 provides a histogram
of the log of total health expenditures per capita.
B. GDP
The panel data on annual real GDP per capita are from PennWorld Table (PWT)
version 8.0 (Feenstra et al., 2013), covering 167 countries for the period 1950-
2011. Total expenditure-side real GDP in PPP international dollars is used and
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converted to per capita terms using the population data provided. Compared to
version 7.1, PWT 8.0 covers more years that overlap with the health expenditures
data, provides more variables relevant to this study, and takes better care of
export and import prices which is expected to capture the first-stage effect more
precisely. Figure 3.2 provides a histogram of the log of GDP per capita.
C. International oil prices
The time-series data on international oil spot prices are from United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)’s annual crude petroleum
prices, which are the averages of Brent, Dubai and Texas annual spot oil prices
equally weighted, for the period 1960-2013. Figure 3.3 plots the time series of oil
prices from 1960 to 2013, it shows that oil prices began to be quite volatile after
1973 and during 1995 to 2012, the period covered in the baseline estimations,
there are both sharp rises and falls of oil prices.
D. Oil reserves
The cross-country oil reserves data are from U.S. Energy Information Admin-
istration (EIA)’s crude oil proved reserves data, covering 194 countries for the
period 1980-2014. Proved energy reserves are defined as “estimated quantities of
energy sources that analysis of geologic and engineering data demonstrates with
reasonable certainty are recoverable under existing economic and operating con-
ditions” by EIA, and “the location, quantity, and grade of the energy source are
usually considered to be well established in such reserves”. A country’s average
proved oil reserves per capita over the period is used as the time-invariant proxy
for the role of oil production in its economy. Figure 3.4 provides a histogram of
the log of proved oil reserves per capita.
3.3 Results
3.3.1 Reduced-form estimation
This paper begins the analysis by estimating the reduced-form effects that oil
price shocks (∆ ln(pt)× Ij) have on the growth rate of total health expenditures
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per capita. Table 3.2 reports the estimates for different lags and leads of oil price
shocks in order to explore the timing of the effects. In this and all subsequent
estimates, country and year fixed effects are both controlled and standard errors
are clustered at the country level unless otherwise stated. Columns (1) to (4) use
the largest possible sample, and find that the impact effect is always negative and
significant at the 1% level, the one-year lagged effect is significant at the 5% or
10% level, and the two-year lagged effect and the lead effect are not significant.
Columns (5) excludes the five largest net exporters of oil, column (6) excludes
the five largest importers, and column (7) excludes both. The impact effect is
still negative and significant at the 1% level. The one-year lagged effect loses its
significance and changes its sign after the five largest oil exporters are excluded,
which suggests that its positive effects on health expenditures are specific to the
largest oil-exporting countries only. The lead effect is positive and significant at
the 5% level after the five largest exporters are excluded. Column (8) excludes
both the ten largest oil exporters and the ten largest oil importers. The impact
effect remains negative and significant at the 1% level while all other effects are
insignificant. Quantitatively, the impact effect is also much larger than the rest.
Therefore, the reduced-form analysis suggest that oil price shocks have a ro-
bust negative and significant impact effect on the per capita health expenditures
growth rate, while lagged and lead effects are quantitatively much smaller, not
robust, and at most only significant for large oil exporting or importing countries.
3.3.2 First-stage estimation
Table 3.3 reports estimates of the first-stage effects that oil price shocks have
on GDP per capita growth. Similar to the reduced-form estimates, the effects
of different lags and leads of oil price shocks are reported. Columns (1) to (4)
use the largest possible sample, and find that the impact effect is always positive
and significant at the 1% level but all lagged and lead effects are insignificant.
After the five largest oil exporters, importers or both are excluded, as reported in
columns (5) to (7), the impact effect is still positive and significant at at least 5%
level, and the magnitude of the coefficients increases a lot after the five largest oil
exporters are excluded. This is probably due to the general equilibrium effect:
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small oil exporters can take the full benefits of a rise in oil prices being price
takers on the market, however, large oil exporters have to take the feedback of
their increases in exports to the oil price into consideration, thus they cannot
increase their exports to the point where the marginal cost is equal to the price.
Therefore the effects become larger when those large exporters are excluded. The
two-year lagged shocks have a negative effect at the 10% significance level after
the five largest exporters are excluded, and at the 5% level after both the five
largest exporters and importers are excluded, although their magnitudes are less
than 1/5 of the impact effects. Nevertheless, this effect loses its significance when
more large oil exporters and importers are excluded, as we will see in column (8).
Column (8) excludes both the ten largest oil exporters and the ten largest
oil importers, and the impact effect remains positive and significant at the 1%
level and the magnitude of the coefficient increases, while all lagged and lead
effects are insignificant and their magnitude is less than 1/10 of the impact effect.
Therefore, the main finding from the first-stage estimation is that oil price shocks
have robust positive and significant effects on GDP per capita growth on impact.
Quantitatively, a hypothetical country which has oil reserves per capita equal to
the sample average grows about 0.9% faster as the oil price rises by 10% in a
particular year, using the estimate in column (8). This finding is consistent with
and complements the first-stage estimations in Bruckner et al. (2012a, 2012b),
where oil price shocks are defined as the product of the log difference of oil prices
and the average share of oil net exports in GDP. However, this finding differs
in terms of the timing of the effects with Acemoglu et al. (2013), which finds
a positive and significant one-year lagged effect that the interaction of oil price
and regional reserves has on regional income in the US.
To investigate the sources of the increase in income, we re-estimate the first-
stage equation (3.2) using the total GDP, population, employment, average an-
nual wage, capital stock, gross capital return and total factor productivity instead
of GDP per capita as the dependent variable, and the results are reported in Ta-
ble 3.4. Columns (1) and (2) find that the effects of oil price shocks are positive
and significant on total GDP and positive but insignificant on population, which
suggests that the increase in per capita GDP is through the increase in total
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GDP mainly. The effects on total employment are found to be negative but
insignificant as in column (3), yet positive and significant at the 10% level on
average annual wage as in column (4). This result differs with Acemoglu et al.
(2013)’s finding that most of the changes in labor income are due to changes
in employment at constant wages. Column (5) finds negative but insignificant
effects on capital stock, while column (6) finds positive and significant effects on
gross capital returns. The last column finds negative but insignificant effects of
oil price shocks on the PWT’s estimated total factor productivity.
3.3.3 Two-stage estimation
Given the reduced-form and first-stage estimations, the paper now turns to dis-
cussing the two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimation. Since only the impact
effect that oil price shocks have on GDP per capita growth is consistently signif-
icant across all specifications in the first stage, we use current oil price shocks to
instrument for GDP per capita growth. Moreover, since it has been found that
the reduced-form effects of oil price shocks on per capita health expenditures
growth are mainly an impact effect too, the benchmark estimation is to regress
health expenditures per capita growth on GDP per capita growth in the same
year, using current oil price shocks as an instrument for the latter.
Table 3.5 presents the estimates of the effects of economic growth on health
expenditures. Columns (1) and (2) present the OLS estimates. Column (1)
controls no country or year fixed effects, while column (2) controls both. Both find
positive but insignificant effects of GDP per capita growth on health expenditures
per capita growth. Columns (3) to (5) present the 2SLS estimates, using the
largest possible sample, excluding both the top 5 oil exporters and importers, and
excluding both the top 10 oil exporters and importers, respectively. They all find
negative effects of economic growth on health expenditures growth, significant at
the 1% level. The estimated coefficient is -0.96 with a standard error 0.09, and
its 95% confidence interval is [-1.13, -0.78], after excluding both the ten largest
oil exporters and importers, suggesting that 1% faster GDP growth will cause
roughly 1% slower health expenditures growth.
Column (6) controls for more variables, including real GDP level, real GDP
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per capita level, population growth rate, annual changes of the share of popula-
tion less than 15 years old, and annual changes of the share of population ages
65 and above. The effects remain positive and significant at the 1% level and the
estimated coefficient is within one standard deviation from that in column (5).
The 2SLS estimates are dramatically different with the OLS estimates, sug-
gesting that due to possible endogeneity problems aforementioned, the OLS es-
timates are severely upward biased. The Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistics are
above 10 for column (3), slightly less than 10 for column (4), and above 20 for
columns (5) and (6), with 10 being the rule-of-thumb criteria for instruments
to be declared weak according to Staiger and Stock (1997). Column (5) is con-
sidered as our benchmark estimate and most subsequent estimates will exclude
both the top 10 oil exporters and importers.
Table 3.6 investigates which components of total health expenditures are more
responsive to economic growth. Column (1) is copied from column (5) of Table 3.5
for comparison. Columns (2) to (4) report the estimates for government, private,
and out-of-pocket health expenditures respectively. Columns (5) to (9) report the
impacts of income on the shares of government, private, out-of-pocket, inpatient
care, and prevention and public health services in total health expenditures. The
estimate of government health expenditures in column (2) is higher than that of
total health expenditures, yet it is still within the latter’s 95% confidence interval,
therefore as shown in column (5), economic growth is found to have positive
but insignificant effects on the share of government expenditures in total health
expenditures. On the other hand, the estimate of private health expenditures in
column (3) is lower than that of total health expenditures, therefore as shown in
column (6), economic growth is found to have negative and significant effects on
the share of private expenditures in total health expenditures.
The results are similar if we use the out-of-pocket health expenditures in re-
placement of private expenditures, as reported in columns (4) and (7). Those
estimates suggest that private and out-of-pocket health expenditures are more
negatively responsive to economic growth than public health expenditures. More-
over, column (8) finds negative and significant effects of economic growth on the
share of inpatient care in total health expenditures, however, due to data avail-
65
ability, the observation size and the number of countries are much smaller than
other estimations and its standard error is much larger. Column (9) finds no
significant impacts on the share of prevention and public health services in total
health expenditures.
3.4 Discussion
The benchmark estimations find unexpected negative effects of GDP per capita
growth on health expenditures per capita growth, does this imply that health is an
inferior good? Not exactly. First of all, health expenditures are not equivalent to
good health, and sometimes they are even negatively related. For example, people
with bad health conditions are likely to spend more on medical expenditures than
healthy people with other things the same. Among others, De Nardi et al. (2010)
find in the AHEAD data that conditional on permanent income, gender, and age,
people in good health spend around 50% less on health care annually than those
in bad health.
Next, also related to the first point, many expenditures or behaviors which
incur opportunity costs that improve health are not captured in the health expen-
ditures data, one can easily think of spending on healthier food, gym membership
and exercise equipment as examples. The effects of income on health expendi-
tures are likely to change if all those implicit spending on health is included in
total health expenditures.
Last but not least, the estimate is not really a pure income effect, which
should be the sole effect of an exogenous increase in income. Faster GDP per
capita growth also increases the opportunity cost of “investing” in one’s health as
the capital return is now higher and of taking time to receive medical services as
the labor return is now higher too. Probably a result of all those factors, Ozkan
(2011) finds that the bottom income quintile in the US spends more on medical
expenditures than the top income quintile between 25 and 84 years old, while
the latter only spends more before 25 or after 84 years old.
Therefore this paper offers two potential channels that faster economic growth
can have negative effects on health expenditures. One is through an improve-
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ment in health. People’s health may improve as the economy grows, yet not all
by the means of more medical spending. For example, more sufficient food and
clean water supply can improve the general health conditions in less-developed
economies, and lifestyle changes such as diet control and more exercises can
improve the public health in more-developed economies. Among others, Lin-
dahl (2005) finds statistically significant evidence of income causally improving
mental health and reducing overweight. As a result, health expenditures in the
traditional way of more medical spending may reduce due to the improvement
in health by other means.
The other channel is through higher opportunity cost. As found in column
(4) of Table 3.4 and in Acemoglu et al. (2013), oil price shocks have positive and
significant effects on labor income. Thus, the opportunity cost of taking time to
receive medical services increase. This could possibly explain why Acemoglu et
al. (2013) find that local area income have negative effects on number of hospital
admissions and inpatient days though the effects on total hospital expenditures
are positive. Higher opportunity cost of time is also consistent with column (8) of
Table 3.6, which finds that GDP per capita growth reduces the share of inpatient
care in total health expenditures, since inpatient care usually takes much more
time than out-patient care. Meanwhile, as found in column (6) of Table 3.4, oil
price shocks also have positive and significant effects on capital returns, which
increase the opportunity cost of spending on health at the moment, if some health
expenditures such as dental care can be delayed.
These two channels can work at the same time, however, since the former
is from an improvement in health and the latter is expected to have negative
effects on health, we can infer the dominance of the two channels by examining
the changes of health conditions in the next subsection.
3.4.1 Health indicators
Do people’s health improve as a country’s GDP grows? Table 3.7 reports the
effects of GDP growth on adult mortality rates and life expectancy at birth.
Columns (1) to (4) examine the effects of economic growth on adult mortality
rates, which are the probabilities of dying between the ages of 15 and 60. Columns
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(1) and (3) regress annual changes of female and male adult mortality rates on
GDP per capita growth up to 4-year lags.
Contrary to what might have been expected: all the coefficients are positive
for the growth rates from the impacts to 4-year lags, for both genders. The impact
effect is significant at the 10% level for both genders, and the 3- and 4-year lagged
effects are significant for females at the 10% and 5% levels respectively. Columns
(2) and (4) report the estimates of the effects of the 5-year average GDP growth
on adult mortality rates, both are positive and the estimate is significant at the
5% level for females and at the 10% level for males. The instruments used are
the 5-year average oil price shocks, and they pass the weak instrument test as
indicated by the Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistics. According to the estimate
in column (2), 1% faster GDP growth for five years increases the female adult
mortality rate by roughly 0.2 per 1000 female adults.
Similarly, columns (5) to (8) examine the effects of economic growth on life
expectancy at birth. Columns (5) to (7) report the results for female, male and
total life expectancy at birth. The impact effect is negative and significant at
the 5% level for female and total life expectancy, and at the 10% level for males.
The lagged coefficients are mostly negative but none of them are significant.
The author cannot find a positive and significant effect of GDP growth on life
expectancy up to ten-year lags (not reported here). Column (8) reports the
estimate for the 5-year average growth on total life expectancy, which is negative
but not significant.
There are other papers in the literature which find negative effects of eco-
nomic growth on health conditions, such as Ruhm (2000, 2003), Granados and
Ionides (2008) and Bezruchka (2009). This paper uses an instrumental variable
approach and finds that 5-year average GDP growth rates have positive and
significant effects on adult mortality rates and GDP growth have negative and
significant impact effects on life expectancy. Those findings suggest that the
higher-opportunity-cost channel mentioned in the previous subsection is likely
to be the dominant factor over the health-improvement channel. Moreover, as
life expectancy is calculated using age- and sex-specific death rates, the loss of
significance when the dependent variable changes from adult mortality rates to
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life expectancy suggest that the effects of GDP growth on mortality rates of chil-
dren and elderly are not as significant as adults. This supports the explanation
offered by the rising opportunity cost due to higher labor returns, as children
and elderly are mostly out of the labor force and therefore less affected by the
rising opportunity cost of health services.
3.4.2 Long-run effects
The long-run effects of economic growth on health expenditures are explored by
using the average growth rates of total health expenditures per capita and GDP
per capita over longer time, the latter being instrumented by the average oil
price shocks over the same period. Table 3.8 presents the two-stage least squares
estimates, from the 1-year impact to the 5-year average effects. Column (1) is
copied from the benchmark estimate as a reference. Columns (2) to (5) use the
2- to 5-year average growth rates respectively.
All the estimates are negative and significant at the 1% level. The coefficient
estimates are lower when using the 2- to 4-year average growth rates but higher
when using the 5-year average growth than the short-run estimate, however, they
are all within the 95% confidence interval of the benchmark estimate. The esti-
mate of the 5-year average GDP growth on the total health expenditures growth
over the period is -0.82 with a standard error 0.30, and its 95% confidence is [-
1.41, -0.23], which is wider than that for the short-run estimate. The estimations
stop at using 5-year average growth rates as it is found that the Kleibergen-Paap
Wald F statistic is below Staiger and Stock’s (1997) rule of thumb for weak in-
struments when using longer than 5-year average oil price shocks to instrument
for average GDP growth.
3.5 Robustness Checks
3.5.1 Country subsamples
Do the effects of economic growth on health expenditures differ across countries
with different income or oil abundance? The countries in the sample are first
divided into two even subgroups, higher-income and lower-income, according to
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their real GDP per capita in 1994 (as WHO’s health expenditures data start
from 1995), and the income elasticities are estimated for both subgroups using
the benchmark specification. The results are reported in columns (1) and (2) in
Table 3.9. Both estimates are negative and significant at the 1% significance level,
and within the 95% confidence interval of the benchmark estimate. The lower-
income countries demonstrate a slightly higher estimate than the higher-income
countries, but this difference is not significant at the 5% level. Column (3) reports
the estimate using OECD member countries only. The estimate remains negative
and significant at the 1% level, and it is lower than that for the whole sample but
not significant at the 5% level. Those results suggest that the negative effects
of GDP per capita growth on health expenditures per capita growth are robust
across countries in the earlier or later stages of development, and the estimates
are slightly lower for more-developed countries.
Column (4) reports the estimate using countries that have positive oil reserves
only, which is quite close to the benchmark estimate and remains significant at
the 1% level. Furthermore, the countries in this subsample are ranked according
to their oil reserves per capita and the estimation uses the more oil abundant
half of the subsample only, of which the result is reported in column (5). The
estimate is the same as in column (4) and remains quite close to the benchmark
estimate. Those findings suggest that the negative effects that economic growth
have on health expenditures are not specific to the countries that have oil reserves
or the countries that have large oil reserves, and the estimate is quite close across
countries with different oil abundance.
3.5.2 Timing of the effects
Though the reduced-form and the first-stage estimations suggest that the effects
of GDP growth on health expenditures should be mostly an impact effect, the
effects of lagged GDP per capita growth are examined in Table 3.10 as a robust-
ness check. Column (1) regresses health expenditures growth on the current-year
GDP growth only, while columns (2) to (4) include 1-year, 1- and 2-year, 1- to
3-year lagged GDP growth. Column (2) finds a negative 1-year lagged effect
significant at the 10% level, however, this effect loses its significance when more
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lags are included as in columns (3) and (4). Columns (3) and (4) find a negative
2-year lagged effect significant at the 5% level. Columns (5) and (6) exclude
the top 5 and the top 10 oil exporters and importers respectively. The 2-year
lagged effect loses its significance after the top 5 exporters and importers are
excluded, and the 1-year lagged effect is significant at the 5% level but switches
its sign from positive in columns (2) to (4) to negative. The impact effect is neg-
ative and significant at the 1% level across all specifications, and its coefficient
is quantitatively much larger than all others.
3.5.3 Population growth and structure
One of the concerns of interpreting the results is that the population structure
may change as national income rises, which in turn can affect health expen-
ditures per capita, as health expenditures vary a lot across ages. Though some
demographic variables have already been controlled in column (6) of Table 3.5, to
further address this concern, the impacts of GDP growth on population structure
are estimated and reported in Table 3.11.
The effects on birth rates and fertility rates are reported in columns (1) and
(2), which are found to be positive but insignificant. The effects on population
growth rate are reported in column (3), which are positive but insignificant,
consistent with the finding in Brueckner and Schwandt (2014) that the reduced-
form effects of oil price shocks on population growth are only significant after
five years. The impacts of economic growth on the shares of population less
than 15 years old, between 15 and 64 years old, and 65 years old and above
are reported in columns (4) to (6) respectively. The estimates are positive for
the first two and negative for the last one, but none of them are significant.
In summary, there are no significant effects found that economic growth have
on either population growth or structure. Nevertheless, a better approach is
still to construct a measure of age-specific health utilization weighted population
in replacement of total population, as introduced by Acemoglu et al. (2013),
however, we do not have the luxury of the data availability for cross-country
health utilization across age groups.
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3.5.4 An alternative specification of the instrument
In this subsection, an alternative proxy for the role of oil production in a country’s
economy Ij , namely, the average share of oil net exports in a country’s GDP, is
used to construct the instrument. The data of oil net exports are from UN
Comtrade Database, and they are divided by the country’s current GDP to get
the share of oil net exports in GDP. The average is taken over twenty years from
1994 to 2013, covering the time span of the health expenditures data.
The reduced-form and first-stage estimations are reported in Table 3.12 and
3.13 respectively. The reduced-form estimation find that current oil price shocks
have negative and significant effects on health expenditures per capita growth,
which are robust across all specifications. All lagged effects are not significant in
any specification and their coefficients are much smaller in magnitude. The first-
stage estimation find that current oil price shocks have positive and significant
effects on GDP per capita growth, which are robust and consistent across all
specifications. For some specifications, the one-year and two-year lagged effects
are positive and significant, however, their coefficients are around one fourth of
the impact effects. These two lagged effects will be included in instruments in
some specifications of the 2SLS estimation.
The results of the two-stage estimation are reported in Table 3.14. Columns
(1) to (3) use current-year oil price shocks as the instrument only, and they
find that the effects of GDP growth on health expenditures are negative and
significant at the 1% level, and the Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistics are much
higher than the criteria for weak instruments. After excluding both the top 10 oil
exporters and importers, the coefficient is -0.98 with a standard error 0.16, and
its 95% confidence interval is [-1.31, -0.66], which are quite close to those of the
benchmark estimation. In column (4), the current-, one- and two-year lagged oil
price shocks are used as instruments, as indicated by some specifications in the
first-stage estimation, and the estimate is the same as in column (3) and their
95% confidence intervals are similar too.
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3.6 Conclusion
Using oil price shocks as an instrumental variable for GDP per capita growth,
this paper finds that economic growth has a negative and significant effect on
health care expenditure in the current year. Using the growth rates of GDP and
health expenditures over longer horizons, the long-run effects still remain nega-
tive and significant. Though there are quite a few channels through which eco-
nomic growth can have either positive or negative effects on health expenditures,
including the income and substitution effects, the finding that adult mortality
rates rise after faster economic growth suggests that the higher opportunity cost
of receiving medical services is likely to be the dominating force. Due to the data
unavailability, we cannot examine the responses of the number of doctors’ visits
and the spending on different types of medical services to economic growth in
this cross-country dataset. However, this may be done with micro-level data in
some countries using similar methodology.
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Table 3.1: Summary statistics
Variable Mean SD
From WHO Global Health Expenditures Database
In million constant (2005) PPP
Total expenditures on health 25139.57 142235.7
General government expenditures on health 14330.68 68852.64
Private expenditures on health 10692.06 75388.71
Out of pocket expenditures on health 5260.95 21080.54
% of total health expenditures
General government expenditures on health 57.78778 20.72059
Private expenditures on health 42.22923 20.80049
Out of pocket expenditures on health 33.92831 19.91787
Total expenditures on inpatient care 31.42854 16.46388
Public and prevention health services 5.215744 6.364272
From World Development Indicators (WDI)
Birth rate, crude (per 1,000 people) 29.55864 13.11019
Fertility rate, total (births per woman) 4.156085 2.039528
Mortality rate, adult, female (per 1,000 female adults) 203.1754 125.6109
Mortality rate, adult, male (per 1,000 male adults) 273.4688 118.669
Life expectancy at birth, female (years) 65.5074 12.24156
Life expectancy at birth, male (years) 60.91163 10.93573
Life expectancy at birth, total (years) 63.1535 11.52814
Population ages 0-14 (% of total) 35.33526 10.13919
Population ages 15-64 (% of total) 58.57922 6.861571
Population ages 65 and above (% of total) 6.085526 4.106217
Population growth (annual %) 1.856988 1.674359
From Penn World Table version 8.0 (PWT 8.0)
Expenditures-side GDP at chain PPPs (in mil. 2005 US$) 209750.6 812339.6
Number of persons engaged (in millions) 14.54554 56.91973
Share of labor compensation in GDP at current national prices 0.545902 0.1361507
Capital stock at constant 2005 national prices (in mil. US$) 644395 2601463
TFP at constant national prices (2005=1) 0.9693628 0.2936647
From United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD)
Crude petroleum price, average of UK Brent/Dubai/Texas 26.47259 28.2239
equally weighted ($/barrel)
From U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA)
Crude oil proved reserves (billion barrels) 5.29387 24.70284
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Table 3.2: Reduced-form effects of oil price shocks on total health expenditures
Δln(h) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Exclude
Top 5 Top 10
×10−6 exp. imp. both both
Oilshock, -17.9*** -17.2*** -17.9*** -17.6*** -65.6*** -17.5*** -65.6*** -95.6***
t (3.55) (3.47) (3.57) (3.36) (8.64) (3.36) (8.65) (17.1)
Oilshock, 4.37** 4.11** 4.77* -1.02 4.76* -1.06 -7.71
t-1 (1.91) (1.91) (2.43) (4.50) (2.44) (4.50) (9.01)
Oilshock, -1.44 -1.36 -0.75 -1.41 -0.98 34.5
t-2 (1.30) (1.24) (17.5) (1.25) (17.5) (21.4)
Oilshock, 1.47 6.57** 1.46 6.55** 5.45
t+1 (1.30) (3.10) (1.31) (3.12) (7.63)
Obs. 2997 2981 2965 2789 2712 2709 2632 2472
Countries 177 177 177 177 172 172 167 157
Note: The method of estimation is least squares. Country and year fixed effects are controlled and
standard errors in parentheses are Huber robust and clustered at the country level. Column (5) excludes
the five largest oil exporters: Saudi Arabia, Russia, UAE, Kuwait, and Iraq. Column (6) excludes
the five largest oil importers: USA, China, Japan, India, and Korea. Column (7) excludes both the
five largest oil exporters and the five largest importers. Column (8) excludes both the ten largest oil
exporters and importers. The ten largest oil exporters include those in the top 5 plus Nigeria, Venezuela,
Qatar, Angola, and Canada. The ten largest oil importers include those in the top 5 plus Germany,
France, Singapore, Spain, and Italy. *Significantly different from zero at the 10% significance level, **
5% significance level, *** 1% significance level.
Table 3.3: First-stage effects of oil price shocks on GDP per capita growth
Δln(y) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Exclude
Top 5 Top 10
×10−6 exp. imp. both both
Oilshock, 14.9*** 15.0*** 14.6*** 14.9*** 52.0** 14.8*** 51.9** 127***
t (4.13) (4.13) (3.79) (3.62) (20.8) (3.61) (20.7) (27.4)
Oilshock, 0.39 0.20 0.75 0.82 0.74 0.76 0.31
t-1 (0.35) (0.40) (0.72) 3.90 (0.73) (3.89) (9.64)
Oilshock, -1.00 -0.99 -10.1* -1.02 -10.2** -1.44
t-2 (1.09) (1.11) (5.22) (1.12) (5.19) (10.3)
Oilshock, 1.27 -2.10 1.30 -1.96 -8.60
t+1 (0.90) (3.21) (0.89) (3.24) (10.1)
Obs. 2788 2788 2788 2785 2717 2700 2632 2462
Countries 164 164 164 164 160 159 155 145
Note: The method of estimation is least squares. Country and year fixed effects are controlled and
standard errors in parentheses are Huber robust and clustered at the country level. Column (5) excludes
the five largest oil exporters, column (6) excludes the five largest oil importers, and column (7) excludes
both the five largest oil exporters and importers. Column (8) excludes both the ten largest oil exporters
and importers. *Significantly different from zero at the 10% significance level, ** 5% significance level,
*** 1% significance level.
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Table 3.4: The sources of the increase in GDP per capita growth
Total Pop. Employ. Avg. annual Capital Gross capital TFP
GDP wage stock return
×10−6 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Oilshock, t 74.4*** 0.62 -0.60 46.1* -3.37 24.5*** -3.17
(13.8) (0.64) (2.01) (27.0) (2.62) (8.65) (5.62)
Obs. 6411 6451 5640 4336 6411 4736 3883
Countries 145 145 144 107 145 107 92
Note: The method of estimation is least squares. Country and year fixed effects are controlled and
standard errors in parentheses are Huber robust and clustered at the country level. All columns exclude
both the ten largest oil exporters and importers. Average annual wage is calculated by the total labor
compensation in real GDP divided by total employment. Gross capital return is calculated by total
capital compensation in real GDP divided by total capital stock. Total factor productivity is calculated
by Penn World Table version 8.0. Log differences are taken for the dependent variables in all columns
expect for (6), for which a absolute difference is taken. *Significantly different from zero at the 10%
significance level, ** 5% significance level, *** 1% significance level.
Table 3.5: The effects of economic growth on health expenditures (OLS and
2SLS)
Δln(h) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Excl. top 5 Excl. top 10 Excl. top 10
exp. & imp. exp. & imp. exp. & imp.
OLS OLS IV IV IV IV
GDP p.c. growth 0.04 0.03 -1.42*** -1.09*** -0.96*** -0.91***
(0.06) (0.06) (0.21) (0.18) (0.09) (0.10)
95% conf. int. [-1.84; -1.01] [-1.44; -0.74] [-1.13; -0.78] [-1.10; -0.71]
Kleibergen-Paap 12.57 8.80 24.97 26.38
Wald F statistic
Country FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2588 2588 2556 2413 2253 2218
Countries 162 162 160 151 141 139
Note: The method of estimation is ordinary least squares for columns (1) and (2) and two-stage least
squares for columns (3) to (6). Standard errors in parentheses are Huber robust and clustered at
the country level. Column (4) excludes both the five largest oil exporters and importers. Column
(5) and (6) exclude both the ten largest oil exporters and importers. Column (6) controls for more
variables, including real GDP level, real GDP per capita level, population growth rate, annual changes
of share of population less than 15 years old, and annual changes of share of population ages 65 and































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.7: The effects of economic growth on health indicators
Adult mortality rates Life expectancy at birth
female female male male female male total total
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
GDP p.c. 3.10* 3.50* -0.32** -0.25* -0.28**
growth, t (1.70) (1.95) (0.14) (0.13) (0.13)
GDP p.c. 2.32 -0.59 -0.03 0.03 0.004
growth, t-1 (1.61) (1.77) (0.15) (0.13) (0.14)
GDP p.c. 2.55 1.71 -0.14 -0.007 -0.08
growth, t-2 (1.76) (2.36) (0.17) (0.13) (0.14)
GDP p.c. 5.74* 6.70 -0.04 -0.15 -0.10
growth, t-3 (3.42) (4.11) (0.18) (0.21) (0.18)
GDP p.c. 7.92** 4.55 -0.13 -0.05 -0.09
growth, t-4 (3.52) 3.44 (0.22) (0.21) (0.19)
5-year avg. 21.11** 15.67* -0.55
growth (9.23) (8.80) (0.51)
Kleibergen-Paap 20.54 20.54 20.50
Wald F statistic
Observations 5664 5664 5664 5664 5723 5723 5723 5723
Countries 142 142 142 142 143 143 143 143
Note: The method of estimation is two-stage least squares. Country and year fixed effects are controlled
and standard errors in parentheses are Huber robust and clustered at the country level. All columns
exclude both the ten largest oil exporters and importers. Annual differences are taken for the dependent
variable in all columns. *Significantly different from zero at the 10% significance level, ** 5% significance
level, *** 1% significance level.
Table 3.8: The long-run average effects of economic growth on health expendi-
tures
Health spending (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
p.c. growth Impact 2-year avg. 3-year avg. 4-year avg. 5-year avg.
GDP p.c. growth -0.96*** -1.00*** -1.07*** -1.07*** -0.82***
(0.09) (0.10) (0.19) (0.28) (0.30)
95% conf. int. [-1.13; -0.78] [-1.20; -0.80] [-1.45; -0.69] [-1.63; -0.52] [-1.41; -0.23]
Kleibergen-Paap 24.97 26.51 17.81 14.67 14.24
Wald F statistic
Observations 2253 2112 1971 1830 1689
Countries 141 141 141 141 141
Note: The method of estimation is two-stage least squares. Country and year fixed effects are controlled
and standard errors in parentheses are Huber robust and clustered at the country level. All columns
exclude both the ten largest oil exporters and importers. In columns (2) to (5), the average growth rates
of health expenditures per capita and GDP per capita over 2 to 5 years respectively are used as the
dependent and the independent variables, the latter being instrumented by the average oil price shocks
over the period. *Significantly different from zero at the 10% significance level, ** 5% significance level,
*** 1% significance level.
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Table 3.9: Country subgroups according to income and oil abundance
Δln(h) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Low-income High-income OECD With oil More oil
GDP p.c. -0.83*** -1.01*** -1.30*** -0.91*** -0.91***
growth, t (0.10) (0.12) (0.20) (0.09) (0.11)
95% conf. int. [-1.02; -0.64] [-1.24; -0.79] [-1.70; -0.91] [-1.09; -0.73] [-1.12; -0.69]
Kleibergen-Paap 21.31 43.23 8.47 26.52 28.92
Wald F statistic
Observations 1133 1120 432 1152 576
Countries 71 70 27 72 36
Note: The method of estimation is two-stage least squares. Country and year fixed effects are controlled
and standard errors in parentheses are Huber robust and clustered at the country level. All columns
exclude both the ten largest oil exporters and importers. Column (1) includes those countries in the
sample that have GDP per capita in 1994 equal or below the median only. Column (2) includes those
countries in the sample that have GDP per capita in 1994 above the median only. Column (3) includes
OECD member countries only. Column (4) includes those countries that have positive oil reserves only.
Column (5) includes those countries in column (4) that have oil reserves per capita higher than the
median only. *Significantly different from zero at the 10% significance level, ** 5% significance level,
*** 1% significance level.
Table 3.10: Timing of the effects of economic growth on health expenditures
Δln(h) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Excl. largest exp. & imp.
Top 5 Top 10
GDP p.c. growth, t -1.42*** -1.39*** -1.46*** -1.48*** -1.17*** -0.99***
(0.21) (0.22) (0.21) (0.21) (0.20) (0.09)
GDP p.c. growth, t-1 0.43* 0.39 0.41 -0.09 -0.22**
(0.24) (0.27) (0.31) (0.12) (0.11)
GDP p.c. growth, t-2 -0.31** -0.31** -0.48 -0.09
(0.15) (0.15) (0.31) (0.08)
GDP p.c. growth, t-3 0.24 0.004 -0.17
(0.34) (0.14) (0.14)
Observations 2556 2556 2556 2556 2413 2253
Countries 160 160 160 160 151 141
Note: The method of estimation is two-stage least squares. Country and year fixed effects are controlled
and standard errors in parentheses are Huber robust and clustered at the country level. All columns
exclude both the ten largest oil exporters and importers. *Significantly different from zero at the 10%
significance level, ** 5% significance level, *** 1% significance level.
Table 3.11: The impacts of economic growth on population growth and structure
Δbirth rate Δfert. rate Pop. growth Δ(%<15) Δ(%15-64) Δ(%>64)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GDP p.c. 0.15 0.04 0.68 0.005 0.03 -0.03
growth, t (0.67) (0.13) (0.82) (0.19) (0.20) (0.03)
Kleibergen-Paap 26.80 26.82 26.77 26.84 26.84 26.84
Wald F statistic
Observations 6335 6286 6407 6288 6288 6288
Countries 145 144 145 142 142 142
Note: The method of estimation is two-stage least squares. Country and year fixed effects are controlled
and standard errors in parentheses are Huber robust and clustered at the country level. All columns
exclude both the ten largest oil exporters and importers. *Significantly different from zero at the 10%
significance level, ** 5% significance level, *** 1% significance level.
79
Table 3.12: Reduced-form effects of oil price shocks on total health expenditures
(alternative IV)
Δln(h) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Exclude
Top 5 Top 10
exp. imp. both both
Oilshock, -1.10*** -1.08*** -1.09*** -1.11*** -0.97*** -1.12*** -0.97*** -0.93***
t (0.16) (0.15) (0.16) (0.16) (0.15) (0.16) (0.15) (0.15)
Oilshock, 0.09 0.08 0.01 -0.03 0.01 -0.03 -0.08
t-1 (0.07) (0.07) (0.09) (0.07) (0.09) (0.07) (0.08)
Oilshock, -0.02 -0.06 0.02 -0.07 0.01 0.12
t-2 (0.12) (0.10) (0.12) (0.11) (0.12) (0.10)
Oilshock, -0.16 -0.14 -0.16 -0.14 -0.20
t-3 (0.14) (0.16) (0.14) (0.16) (0.17)
Obs. 2813 2797 2781 2765 2684 2680 2599 2446
Countries 166 166 166 166 161 161 156 147
Note: The method of estimation is least squares. Country and year fixed effects are controlled and
standard errors in parentheses are Huber robust and clustered at the country level. Oil price shocks are
measured by oil price growth rate interacted with the average share of oil net exports in the country’s
GDP. *Significantly different from zero at the 10% significance level, ** 5% significance level, *** 1%
significance level.
Table 3.13: First-stage effects of oil price shocks on GDP per capita growth
(alternative IV)
Δln(y) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Exclude
Top 5 Top 10
exp. imp. both both
Oilshock, 0.66*** 0.66*** 0.67*** 0.67*** 0.63*** 0.66*** 0.63*** 0.59***
t (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.06) (0.09) (0.06) (0.07)
Oilshock, 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.15** 0.05 0.15** 0.15**
t-1 (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07)
Oilshock, 0.07* 0.07* 0.10** 0.06 0.10** 0.12**
t-2 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
Oilshock, -0.01 -0.03 -0.01 -0.03 -0.02
t-3 (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06)
Obs. 6773 6673 6573 6473 6329 6233 6089 5664
Countries 152 152 152 152 148 147 143 134
Note: The method of estimation is least squares. Country and year fixed effects are controlled and
standard errors in parentheses are Huber robust and clustered at the country level. Oil price shocks are
measured by oil price growth rate interacted with the average share of oil net exports in the country’s
GDP. *Significantly different from zero at the 10% significance level, ** 5% significance level, *** 1%
significance level.
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Table 3.14: The effects of economic growth on health expenditures (alternative
IV)
Δln(h) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Exclude largest exp. & imp.
Top 5 Top 10 Top 10
GDP p.c. growth -1.21*** -0.99*** -0.98*** -0.98***
(0.28) (0.15) (0.16) (0.16)
95% conf. interval [-1.76; -0.66] [-1.28; -0.71] [-1.31; -0.66] [-1.29; -0.66]
Instruments Oilshock, t Oilshock, t Oilshock, t Oilshock, t, t-1, t-2
Kleibergen-Paap 30.38 57.66 45.68 21.77
Wald F statistic
Observations 2383 2240 2096 2096
Countries 149 140 131 131
Note: The method of estimation is two-stage least squares. Country and year fixed effects are
controlled and standard errors in parentheses are Huber robust and clustered at the country
level. Oil price shocks are measured by oil price growth rate interacted with the average share of
oil net exports in the country’s GDP. *Significantly different from zero at the 10% significance
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Figure 3.1: Total health expenditures per capita, 1995-2012.
The histogram of total health expenditures per capita in constant (2005) PPP, 1995-2012, from
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Figure 3.2: Real GDP per capita, 1950-2011.
The histogram of real GDP per capita in constant (2005) PPP, 1950-2011, from Penn World
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Figure 3.3: Annual oil prices, 1960-2013.
The time series of international oil prices, 1960-2013, from UNCTAD’s annual crude petroleum











−5 0 5 10
ln(Proved oil reserves per capita)
Figure 3.4: Proved oil reserves per capita.
The cross-sectional distribution of proved oil reserves per capita, for the 89 countries that
have positive oil reserves only, out of 160 countries in the sample, from EIA’s crude oil proved
reserves data. The unit is barrels per capita and the variable is displayed in logs.
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Proofs in Chapter One
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
The proof is based on (1.26) that determines the balanced growth rate. The LHS
of (1.26) is strictly increasing and concave in g if 0 < α + η < 1; else, it equals
one if α + η = 1. The RHS, denoted R(g), is positive under the transversality
(σ − 1)g + ρ > 0. Then,
R′(g) = −(α+ η)R(g)
[ −γ + σ(1− β + γ)
−γg + (1− β + γ)(σg + ρ)
]
−R(g) ασ
(1− β)(σg + ρ) ,




(α+ η)[−γ + σ(1− β + γ)]2
[−γg + (1− β + γ)(σg + ρ)]2 +
ασ2





(α+ η)[−γ + σ(1− β + γ)]
[−γg + (1− β + γ)(σg + ρ)] +
ασ
(1− β)(σg + ρ)
}2
> 0.
Since the LHS is concave and the RHS is strictly convex, the LHS minus the
RHS is strictly concave. Therefore, there are at most two roots to the equation.
The balanced growth rate g∗ is unique when σ > γ/(1− β + γ), since then
the RHS (LHS) of (1.26) is strictly decreasing (non-decreasing) with g. If η = 1
(hence α = 0) as in Lucas (1988), Benhabib and Perli (1994), and Xie (1994), a
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unique solution is from (1.26):
g =
(1− β + γ)(B − ρ)
σ(1− β + γ)− γ .
From (1.22) , b(γ) = 0 in this case. Note that if γ → 0 then g → (B − ρ)/σ.
If σ ≤ γ/(1− β + γ) and 0 < η < 1, there are several cases in which multiple
BGPs may arise. In the first case with α = 0 and 0 < η < 1 (decreasing private
returns to education), the left-hand side of (1.26) is increasing and concave, but
the right-hand side is increasing and convex in g because now R′(g) > 0 for α = 0
and σ ≤ γ/(1 − β + γ), and R′′(g) > 0. Also, the left-hand side g1−η starts at
zero and rises at an infinite rate (1− η)g−η at g = 0 but eventually becomes flat
at higher values of g. Whereas, the right-hand side R(g) starts above zero at
g = 0 and rises at an increasing rate. So it is very likely to have multiple BGPs
as shown in Figure 1.1 based on the parametrization therein. Both the balanced
growth rates in this figure meet the transversality condition.
In the second case with α > 0 and α + η = 1, the left-hand side of (1.26)
equals one, whereas the right-hand side may first decline at low growth rates,
since now the second term of R′(g) is negative, but may eventually increase at
high growth rates as in the first case, as shown in Figure 1.2. As R′′(g) > 0, the
necessary and sufficient conditions for multiple roots in (1.26) in this case are:
(a) R(0) ≥ 1, (b) R′(0) < 0, and (c) min
g
















(1 + α− β)(1− β + γ) . (A.2)
The lower bound (on σ) for R′(0) < 0 is below the upper bound, σ < γ/(1−β+γ),
for possible multiple BGPs. Last, R′(g) switches its sign from negative to positive
at g such that R′(g) = 0 where
g =
ρασ(1− β + γ)− ρ(1− β)[γ − σ(1− β + γ)]
σ(1− β + α)[γ − σ(1− β + γ)] .
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In the last case with α > 0 and α+η < 1, the LHS of (1.26) is increasing and
concave in g, while the RHS is (eventually) an increasing and convex function
because R′(g) > 0 for high enough values of g and R′′(g) > 0. So multiple BGPs
may arise, as shown in Figure 1.3, where transversality holds.
A.2 Equivalence of the problems in Section 1.3.3 and
(1.1)-(1.4)




1− σ +µ [(1−τ)rνK + (1−τ)wuH−C]+λB[(1−ν)K]
α[(1−u)H]ηHb(γ)a .
The first-order conditions are:
C : C−σ − µ = 0, (A.4)
K : µ(1− τ)rν + λαX/K = ρµ− µ˙, (A.5)
H : µ(1− τ)wu+ ληX/H = ρλ− λ˙, (A.6)
ν : µ(1− τ)rK − λαX/(1− ν) = 0, (A.7)
u : µ(1− τ)wH − ληX/(1− u) = 0, (A.8)
and the transition equations (1.3) and K˙ = (1−τ)rνK+(1−τ)wuH−C. Using
r = βY/(νK) and w = (1− β)Y/(uH), the above equations can be expressed as
follows:
K : µβ(1− τ)Y/K + λαX/K = ρµ− µ˙,
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H : µ(1− β)(1− τ)Y/H + ληX/H = ρλ− λ˙,
ν : µβ(1− τ)Y/ν − λαX/(1− ν) = 0,
u : µ(1− β)(1− τ)Y/u− ληX/(1− u) = 0,
K˙ = (1− τ)βY + (1− τ)(1− β)Y − C = (1− τ)Y − C,
and the other two equations are the same with (1.5) and (1.3). Moreover, the
transversality conditions are the same as those in Section 1.2. Therefore, the
solution to this problem is the same as that to (1.1) - (1.4), except for an effective
TFP at (1− τ)A instead of A.
A.3 Proof of Lemma 1
The elements of matrix J and (1.32) lead to








1− β + γ g
∗2 +
[
−(1− β)(η + α) + (η + α)1− β
σ
· γ






























− (1− β + γ)
(
α








which determines the sign of det(J) since Q > 0 as shown below (1.21).
A.4 Proof of Proposition 2
First, det(J) < 0 if θ ∈ Θ1 by Lemma 1. We show that conditions (i) and (ii) are







































(1− β + γ)(α+ η)− 1− β
σ
− α
≤ 0, if σ ≥ 1 or else if η ≤ 1− β + ασ
(1− σ)(1− β + γ) − α.
The graph of f is a parabola opening downward and f(0) = αγ/(1− β) ≥ 0.
The transversality condition σg∗+ρ > g∗ implies z∗ > 1. So f(1) ≤ 0 is sufficient
for f(z∗)<0.
Second, as the determinant of a matrix equals the product of its eigenvalues,
there are only two possibilities regarding the signs of the eigenvalues: a) all three
eigenvalues are negative; and b) only one of them is negative. We rule of a)
in two cases. First, suppose that tr(J) ≥ 0. Since tr(J) equals the sum of its
eigenvalues, it rules out possibility a) that all three eigenvalues are negative.
Therefore, one and only one of the three eigenvalues is negative and the BGP
is determinate. Now, suppose that tr(J) < 0. We use Theorem 1 in Jess and
Benhabib (1994): “The number of eigenvalues with positive real parts is equal to
the number of variations of sign in the scheme
−1, tr(J), −B(J) + det(J)
tr(J)
, det(J).”
Since the second and the last terms in the scheme above are negative, we
have to show that the third term is positive to prove that two of the eigenvalues
are positive. Note that in this case det(J)/tr(J) > 0. Then, it suffices to show
that B(J) in (1.34) is non-positive on the BGP with the omission of asterisks for
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easy of notations:
B(J) = J21 − J23J32 + J11J33 − J13J31







+ T3 + T4 + T5 + T6 + T7
+ T8 + T9
)
g(σg + ρ) +
(












1− β − β + γ
)
1− β















+ η − 1
]
,














T4 = (1− u)Q−1 1 + α
β









[1− β − (α− β)ν],









, T7 = −T1,
T8 = Q
−1 1− β
1− β + γ η
ν







1− β + γ
η
1− u,












Recall that Q > 0 below (1.21). The negative sign of the trace in this case
means





(σg + ρ) < 0,
where ν − T4/(1 + α) > 1 as shown below:
− T4
1 + α




{(α− β) + β(1−D)[(β − α)ν + 1− β]}





(α− β) + β β − α




β(1− α)(1−D)(1− ν) > 1− ν,
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since β>α (Assumption 2) and 0 <D< 1 in (1.19).
Then, α+T1+T2>0. From this and g<σg+ρ (transversality), it follows that
B(J) ≤
(





+ T3 + T4 + T5 + T6 + T7
+ T8 + T9
)
g(σg + ρ) +
(












+ T3 + T5︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡Tb
+ T4 + T6︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡Tc
+ T2 + T8 + T9︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡Td
 g(σg + ρ)
+
T10 + T11 − νβ 1− βσ︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡Te
 (σg + ρ)2.
Here, Ta ≡ α − αν/β ≤ 0 as ν/β ≥ 1 by (1.28) and the transversality
















































[1− (β − α) 1
u
Q−1(ν − u)]1− β
σ
.
It can be shown that Te ≤ 0 by (1.19) and the definition of Q, and ν/β ≥ 1 by
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(1.28) and the transversality condition. Then, we have
Tbg(σg + ρ) + Te(σg + ρ)
2 ≤ (Tb + Te)g(σg + ρ)
=
{[





































































g(σg + ρ) ≤ 0.
Next, we can also show that Tcg(σg + ρ) + T10(σg + ρ)2 ≤ 0 as follows:





































+ (1 + α)(1− β)(1−D)ν
u
]




































g(σg + ρ) ≤ 0,










= α+ βη − 1 ≤ 0.
Finally, we show that Td ≤ 0:
Td ≡ T2 + T8 + T9 = Q−1 η
1− u
1− β
1− β + γ [−α− 1 + ν] ≤ 0,
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since Q > 0 as shown below (1.21). Therefore, we get that B(J) ≤ 0 as
B(J) = (Ta + Tb + Tc + Td)g(σg + ρ) + (T10 + Te)(σg + ρ)
2
= Tag(σg + ρ) +
[





Tcg(σg + ρ) + T10(σg + ρ)
2
]
+ Tdg(σg + ρ)
≤ 0 + 0 + 0 + 0 = 0.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 3
First, det(J) > 0 if θ ∈ Θ2 by definition. As the determinant equals the product
of the three eigenvalues, this implies that there are only two possibilities: a) all
three eigenvalues are positive; and b) two of them are negative and the other one
is positive. If we denote the two subsets of Θ2, ΘU2 for case a) and ΘI2 for case b),
respectively, then the steady state is unstable if θ ∈ ΘU2 , and it is indeterminate
if θ ∈ ΘI2.
A.6 Proof of Proposition 4
According to Proposition 2, the steady state is determinate if and only if θ ∈ Θ1.
The restriction α = 0 in this case implies:
Θ1 ≡
{
θ ∈ Θ | −1− α− η
σ









− (1− β + γ)(
α










θ ∈ Θ | −1− η
σ















1− β + γ − σ
)}
.
A.7 Proof of Proposition 5
First of all, we show that det(J) is positive if and only if condition (i) is true. As
shown in the proof of Proposition 4, given α = 0, det(J) shares the same sign as
−1− η
σ






− (1− β + γ)η,
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which is positive if and only if condition (i) is met.
Next, since a positive det(J) is necessary for an indeterminate steady state,
condition (i) is actually a necessary condition for the indeterminacy. Thus, there
are only two possibilities regarding the signs of the three eigenvalues: a) all three
are positive; and b) one is positive and two are negative. We prove that only
the latter is possible, given conditions (ii) in the proposition, by considering two
cases: In the first case, the trace of the Jacobian matrix is non-positive. This
rules out the possibility that all three eigenvalues are positive. Therefore, one and
only one of the eigenvalues is positive in this case and the BGP is indeterminate.
In the second case, the trace of the Jacobian matrix is positive. Again to
prove the indeterminacy in this case, we make use of Theorem 1 in Benhabib and
Perli (1994). It suffices to prove that B(J) ≤ 0: We can still use the expression
of B(J) as in the proof of Proposition 2, except that α = 0 here:







+ T3 + T4 + T5 + T6 + T7
+ T8 + T9
)
g(σg + ρ) +
(






We show that α+ T1 + T2 ≥ 0 as follows:
α+ T1 + T2 = 0 +Q
−1(γ − β) 1− β




1− β + γ (1− η)
= Q−1
1− β
1− β + γ η(γ − β −
1− η
1− u∗ )
≥ 0 if η ≥ 1− (γ − β)(1− u∗).
We can substitute u∗ with the expression in (1.27) and write this constraint as
condition (ii) in the proposition. The rest of the proof is the same as that of
Proposition 2.
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A.8 Proof of Proposition 6
According to Proposition 2, the steady state is determinate if and only if θ ∈ Θ1.
The restriction η = 1− α in this case implies:
Θ1 ≡
{
θ ∈ Θ | −1− α− η
σ









− (1− β + γ)(
α














− (1− β + γ)
(
α










θ ∈ Θ | η = 1− α < 1− (1− β)(σ + ρ/g
∗)[γ/σ − (1− β + γ)]
(1− β + γ)(σ + ρ/g∗)− γ
}
.
A.9 Proof of Proposition 7





− (1− β + γ)
(
α







which is positive if and only if condition (i) is met.
The rest of the proof can follow that of Proposition 5, except the part for
B(J) ≤ 0. Using the expression of B(J) as in the proof of Proposition 2 with
η = 1− α yields:







+ T3 + T4 + T5 + T6 + T7
+ T8 + T9
)
g(σg + ρ) +
(






Condition (ii) in the proposition ensures that T1 ≥ 0. There are two cases
regarding the sign of T2: If T2 ≥ 0, then the derivation in the proof of Proposition
2 can be followed for B(J) ≤ 0; and if T2 < 0, then the same derivation can still
be followed, except the part on T8 and T9. Here we prove that T8 +T9 ≤ 0 when
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η = 1− α:
T8 + T9 = Q
−1 1− β



























ν − 1 + α− αν
u
)
The last step made use of ν > u, which can be derived from equation (1.18).
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Appendix B
A Pure Dynastic Model for
Chapter Two
If we ignore the life-cycle and overlapping-generation features of the benchmark
model, and assume savings are all bequeathed to children at the end of life, then
the recursive problem of a dynastic family with inheritance bt and labor efficiency
lt for the current generation is:
W (bt, lt) = max
ct,bt+1
{(1 + T )u(ct) + β [W (bt+1, lt+1) | lt]}
s.t. (1 + T )ct = (1 + rt)bt + (1− τss)wtlt + T · Tr(wtlt)− bt+1,
ct ≥ 0, bt+1 ≥ 0,
which is quite similar to the agent’s problem in Aiyagari (1994), except that each
period here is one generation in the family dynasty. The firm’s problem and the
economic environment are the same as in the benchmark model.
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